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ABSTRACT 
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, the District Court for D.C. in 2015 held that the 
House of Representatives has Article III standing to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable 
Care Act as violations of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.  The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on legislative standing is complicated.  The Court has generally avoided the 
contentious question of whether Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential actions 
because of the difficult separation-of-powers concerns in such cases.  In Raines v. Byrd, the Court 
held that individual members of Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply 
holding office to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute.  In a 2015 decision, Arizona 
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court distinguished 
Raines as a case involving individual legislators and relied on its 1939 decision in Coleman v. 
Miller in holding that the Arizona  Legislature had standing as an institution to challenge an 
allegedly unconstitutional limitation on its legislative authority.  In its Chadha and its Windsor 
decisions, the Court suggested, but did not directly hold that Congress or a house of Congress has 
standing in some circumstances to defend its institutional constitutional authority.  The Arizona, 
Chadha and Windsor decisions implicitly support congressional standing in Burwell.  The Article 
argues in favor of institutional congressional standing by Congress, a house of Congress or a duly 
authorized committee to defend core constitutional authority possessed by Congress, but against 
legislative suits merely challenging how the executive branch implements a particular federal 
statute 
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INTRODUCTION 
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, U.S. District Judge Rose-
mary M. Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia in 2015 held that the U.S. House of Representatives has Article III 
standing to challenge certain provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act” or “ACA”)1 as violations 
 
 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (explaining that the 
ACA seeks “to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and de-
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of the U.S. Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.2  The Supreme 
Court’s and lower federal courts’ jurisprudence on legislative stand-
ing is complicated.3  In its 1939 decision in Coleman v. Miller, the Su-
preme Court held that twenty Kansas state senators, who constituted 
exactly half of the Kansas State Senate, could file a mandamus action 
against the Secretary of the Senate of the State of Kansas to contest 
whether the State Senate had in fact ratified the Child Labor 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.4  By contrast, in its 1997 de-
cision in Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of 
Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply holding 
office to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute even if Con-
gress has enacted a statute purporting to grant standing to any legis-
lators to challenge that statute, unless the legislator can prove she suf-
fered a personal concrete injury from its passage similar to any 
ordinary litigant.5  The broad approach to legislative standing in 
Coleman and the narrower approach in Raines are in some tension, 
although it is possible to distinguish these two cases because they in-
volve very different facts.6  In a 2015 decision, Arizona State Legislature 
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court distinguished 
Raines as a case involving individual legislators and relied on Coleman 
in holding that the Arizona Legislature had standing to challenge 
Proposition 106, a statewide citizen’s initiative that delegated redis-
tricting authority to an independent commission.7  The Arizona State 
Legislature Court explicitly avoided the contentious question of 
 
crease the cost of health care”); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) 
(“The [ACA] adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the 
individual health insurance market.”). 
 2 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 70–76 (D.D.C. 2015) (hold-
ing that “the constitutional trespass alleged in this case would inflict a concrete, particular 
harm upon the House for which it has standing to seek redress”).  The Appropriations 
Clause states in part: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 3 Bradford C. Mank, Does United States v. Windsor (the DOMA Case) Open the Door to Congres-
sional Standing Rights?, 76 U PITT. L. REV. 1, 22–30 (2014) (discussing legislative standing 
cases and acknowledging the difficulty of analogizing these cases to situations involving 
Congesss); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. 
L. REV. 339, 358–63 (2015) (noting that lower courts have “greatly struggled with” con-
gressional standing issues); see infra Part II. 
 4 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–46 (1939) (involving the vote in the Kansas Legisla-
ture); see infra Part II. 
 5 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–30 (1997) (holding that state legislators do not suffer 
injury to themselves which would give them Article III standing). 
 6 Mank, supra note 3, at 25–26 (discussing how Raines distinguished Coleman on the basis 
that the latter decision concerned “the fundamental issue of whether a purported legisla-
tive action established  a valid law or not”); see infra Part II. 
 7 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redisricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015). 
144 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
whether the U.S. Congress has standing to challenge certain presi-
dential or executive actions because of the difficult separation-of-
powers concerns in such cases.8 
The U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell suit may finally force the 
Supreme Court to address whether Congress has standing to bring a 
suit against the President.  There is a stronger argument for granting 
legislative standing in this case because the appropriations power is a 
core constitutional power given to the House and an entire house of 
Congress filed suit rather than just individual legislators.9  A more dif-
ficult question is whether Congress may challenge any alleged legal 
breach by the executive branch.10 
Part I will discuss the basics of Article III standing and the separa-
tion-of-powers concerns raised by congressional suits against the Pres-
ident.11  Part II examines the complex issues involving legislative 
standing.12  Part III explores the reasoning in U.S. House of Representa-
tives v. Burwell.13  Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha.14  Part V discusses the 
majority opinion and two dissenting opinions in United States v. Wind-
sor.15  The Conclusion argues in favor of institutional congressional 
standing by Congress, a house of Congress, or a duly authorized 
committee to defend core constitutional authority possessed by Con-
gress, but against legislative suits merely challenging how the execu-
tive branch implements a particular federal statute.16 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE III STANDING17 
The Constitution does not expressly require that each plaintiff su-
ing in a federal court prove standing; nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted Article III’s limitation of judicial authority to 
 
 8 Id. at 2665 n.12 (“The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether 
Congress has standing to bring a suit against the President.  There is no federal analogue 
to Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and the President would raise 
separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”). 
 9 See infra Part II. 
 10 See infra Parts I, IV, and Conclusion; see also Mank, supra note 3, at 22–30, 40–62 (discuss-
ing competing arguments for and against finding congressional standing). 
 11 See infra Part I. 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 See infra Part III. 
 14 462 U.S. 919, 919–59 (1983) (holding that Congress may not create a power for itself to 
to have a legislative veto over executive actions); infra Part IV. 
 15 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); infra Part V.C–E. 
 16 See infra Conclusion. 
 17 The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing article cited in foot-
note 3. 
Oct. 2016] DOES A HOUSE OF CONGRESS HAVE STANDING? 145 
 
actual “Cases” and “Controversies” as imposing constitutional stand-
ing requirements.18  The Supreme Court has formulated a three-part 
test for constitutional Article III standing that requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that: (1) he has “suffered an injury-in-fact,” which is (a) 
“concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not con-
jectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there [is] a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fair-
ly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party 
not before the court”; and (3) “it [is] likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”19 
A plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all three standing re-
quirements.20  Thus, for an Article III court to have jurisdiction over a 
suit, at least one plaintiff must prove he has standing for each form of 
relief sought.21  Federal courts must dismiss a case for lack of jurisdic-
tion if no plaintiff demonstrates the three Article III standing re-
quirements.22 
 
 18 The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, Section 2, which 
provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies be-
tween two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 
(2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case-or-controversy re-
quirement necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that “[i]f a dispute is not a 
proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it”).  See generally Mi-
chael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 
1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discussing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers intended 
the Constitution to require standing to sue). 
 19 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (second, third, and fourth altera-
tions in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See Nash, supra 
note 3, at 347 (quoting the same). 
 20 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must 
“carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 
(same). 
 21 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)) (confirming that “a plaintiff must demon-
strate standing separately for each form of relief sought”). 
 22 See id. at 340–41 (emphasizing the importance of the case-or-controversy requirement); 
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at the outset of the 
litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing requirements). 
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As discussed above, standing requirements are grounded in fun-
damental constitutional principles inferred from Article III’s explica-
tion of the judicial authority of federal courts.  For example, Article 
III standing principles prohibit advisory opinions as unconstitutional 
because such opinions are not based on an actual “case” or “contro-
versy.”23  Moreover, Article III standing requirements are based on 
fundamental separation-of-powers principles inferred from the Con-
stitution’s three-branch form of government, which includes the divi-
sion of powers between the judiciary and political branches of gov-
ernment so that the “Federal Judiciary respects ‘the proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’”24 
Congress may not authorize suits that violate fundamental stand-
ing principles.25  However, different members of the Supreme Court 
have disagreed concerning the degree to which separation-of-powers 
principles restrict Congress’s authority to authorize standing to sue in 
federal courts for private citizen suits challenging executive branch 
decisions.26  Furthermore, there are also significant separation-of-
powers concerns when Congress or a house of Congress seeks stand-
ing to sue the President.27  Article II of the Constitution requires that 
the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”28  As 
will be discussed in Part IV, Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissenting 
opinion in United States v. Windsor, argued that the executive branch 
has the exclusive authority in most circumstances under Article II’s 
 
 23 See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (“Article III of the Constitution restricts 
the power of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ . . . Federal courts may not ‘de-
cide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them’ or give 
‘opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 24 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), partially abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)). 
 25 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573; see also Nat Stern, 
The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (emphasizing 
the fundamental principle of the judiciary’s “scrupulous adherence to standing require-
ments”). 
 26 Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–78 (concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution 
limit Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete inju-
ry and citing several recent Supreme Court decisions for support), with id. at 580 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . . . .”), and 
id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of the majority’s 
approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the ex-
pense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and ema-
nates”). 
 27 See infra Parts II–IV. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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Take Care Clause to defend, or not to defend, federal statutes.29  
However, he acknowledged that there may be an exception for legis-
lative standing when Congress defends a core institutional power.30  
Some academics go further than Justice Scalia by arguing that execu-
tive authority under Article II’s Take Care Clause is absolutely exclu-
sive and would bar any suits by Congress challenging the enforce-
ment or non-enforcement of a federal statute.31  Because of 
separation-of-powers issues raised by Article II’s Take Care Clause, 
the question of legislative standing is controversial, as Part II will 
show.32 
II.  LEGISLATIVE STANDING 
Whether Congress has Article III standing to challenge a presi-
dential action or inaction raises complicated questions.33  For in-
stance, Congress or a house of Congress has stronger grounds for 
 
 29 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2700–05 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the executive in most circumstances has exclusive authority to defend federal statutes 
under Article II, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the Presi-
dent refuses to enforce a law); see infra Part IV.D. 
 30 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, at 2700; see also Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor Defend-
ants in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1548–49 (2012) (“Chadha, in 
short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional stake to support a case or con-
troversy where it seeks to defend a power granted to it by a statute.  Chadha does not hold 
that Congress may intervene to defend any challenged federal statute . . . .”). 
 31 Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 571, 572–76, 625–30 (2014) (arguing that Article II’s Take Care Clause 
gives the executive branch the exclusive authority to defend federal laws thus precluding 
congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce law).  But 
see Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principle-Agent Problem, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1201, 1219–20 (2012) (“Defending [a] law . . . does not focus on the operation 
of the law and generally will not affect its operation at all. . . . [T]he Executive simply 
provides the court with its understanding of what the Constitution requires . . . .”); Beth-
any R. Pickett, Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in In-
stances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439 (2016) (arguing that Congress 
should have institutional standing when a President refuses to enforce a federal statute).  
See generally Stern, supra note 25, at 11–16 (discussing competing scholarly views on the is-
sue of congressional standing). 
 32 See infra Part II. 
 33 See Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the En-
force-But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 582–98 (2012) (arguing that Con-
gress as an institution, or either house, has standing to defend a statute that the President 
refuses to defend, but acknowledging counter-arguments); Mank, supra note 3, at 23; 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1209–13 (2012) 
(“[I]t is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may intervene as a party or 
simply file a brief as an amicus and whether, if it may intervene, it enjoys all of the rights 
of a party at the district court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and intro-
duce documents, and the like.”); id. at 1210 n.133 (discussing cases). 
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standing than individual members when it is suing to defend a legis-
lature’s institutional powers.34  Furthermore, some important legisla-
tive standing cases have involved state or territorial legislators that do 
not raise the same type of separation-of-powers concerns that arise 
when Congress sues the President.35 
A.  Legislative Standing Cases, 1939–2014: Coleman and Raines Define 
the Line for Legislative Standing 
1.  Coleman v. Miller 
In Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that twenty Kansas 
state senators could seek a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of 
the Senate of the State of Kansas to contest whether the Kansas State 
Senate actually ratified the Child Labor Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution.36  There had been a tie vote of twenty to twenty in the Kan-
sas Senate for the proposed Amendment, and the Lieutenant Gover-
nor, the presiding officer of the Kansas Senate, had broken the tie by 
voting in favor of the Amendment.37  The twenty state senators who 
voted against the Amendment argued that amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution must be enacted by state legislators only and that state 
executive officials should not vote on proposed amendments.38  The 
Supreme Court of Kansas denied the writ because it concluded on 
the merits that the Amendment was validly enacted because the Lieu-
 
 34 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (“We attach some importance to the fact that 
appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in 
this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit. . . . We therefore hold that 
these individual members of Congress do not have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this 
dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III 
standing.”); Mank, supra note 3, at 23; see infra Parts II–IV. 
 35 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redisricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 
n.12 (2015) (explaining that its decision only addressed legislative standing for state legis-
latures and not standing when Congress sues the President, which raises separation-of-
powers concerns absent in the former type of case); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–
46 (1939) (involving a vote in the Kansas Legislature); Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 
539, 542–47 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving bill passed by Guam territorial legislature); Mank, 
supra note 3, at 23–24, 27; see infra Parts II.A.2, II.B. 
 36 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438–46 (holding that the twenty state senators had a Fifth Amend-
ment right to have their vote given effect and that the state court abdridged that right); 
Mank, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
 37 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436–38 (holding that the court has jurisdiction since twenty state 
senators had a Fifth Amendment right to have their votes given effect). 
 38 Id. at 436.  The Kansas House of Representatives subsequently voted to ratify the 
Amendment.  Id. 
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tenant Governor may cast the deciding vote on proposed amend-
ments.39 
After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, determined that the twenty 
Kansas state senators had standing to sue because they had an inter-
est in the “effectiveness of their votes” and whether their votes were 
“given effect.”40  He explained, 
We find no departure from principle in recognizing in the instant case 
that at least the twenty senators whose votes, if their contention were sus-
tained, would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the 
proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy 
which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding 
the federal questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review 
that decision.41 
Crucially, the Kansas senator-plaintiffs were not complaining about 
the state executive’s implementation or interpretation of a law, but 
instead whether the Lieutenant Governor had interfered with the leg-
islative process to nullify their votes as a legislative body.42 
2.  Raines v. Byrd 
In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that individual mem-
bers of Congress normally do not have Article III standing by merely 
holding office to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute, de-
spite Congress’s enactment of a statute purporting to grant standing 
to legislators to challenge that statute,43 unless the legislator can 
demonstrate he has suffered a personal concrete injury from its pas-
sage like any plaintiff.44  Senator Robert Byrd and several other mem-
bers of Congress in Raines alleged that the Line Item Veto Act45 dam-
aged the institution of Congress by unconstitutionally expanding the 
president’s veto authority, but the Court determined that individual 
members of Congress could not sue based on possible generalized 
harm to the legislature when they failed to demonstrate that “their 
 
 39 Id. at 437. 
 40 Id. at 438 (holding that the twenty state senators had a right under the Constitution that 
was denied in this instance); Mank, supra note 3, at 24. 
 41 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446. 
 42 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(interpreting the Coleman decision). 
 43 The statute provided that any member of Congress could assert a constitutional violation 
and sue for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the Line Item Veto Act.  Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815–16 (1997).  
 44 Id. at 821–30 (differentiating between the injury suffered to a legislator as a political pow-
er and as a private injury); Mank, supra note 3, at 24–26. 
 45 See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. 104–130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996). 
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claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise ju-
dicially cognizable.”46  Also, the Court noted that “[w]e attach some 
importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to 
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and in-
deed both Houses actively oppose their suit.”47  Thus, the Raines deci-
sion did not address whether Congress or a house of Congress has 
standing as an institution to challenge executive actions.48 
The Court in Raines distinguished its decision in Coleman and 
strongly implied that case was still good law.49  After reviewing the is-
sues and decision in Coleman, the Raines decision commented: 
It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands . . . for the proposi-
tion that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or 
enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative ac-
tion goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that 
their votes have been completely nullified.50 
The Raines decision distinguished Coleman from the facts in its case by 
explaining that only Coleman involved the fundamental issue of 
whether a purported legislative action established a valid law or not: 
“There is a vast difference between the level of vote nullification at 
issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative 
power that is alleged here.  To uphold standing here would require a 
drastic extension of Coleman.  We are unwilling to take that step.”51  
Additionally, the Raines decision distinguished the facts in its case 
from those in Coleman by observing that “the institutional injury they 
 
 46 Raines, 521 U.S. at 820; see also id. at 821, 830 (recognizing that the claim was not for a 
private personal injury).  By contrast, a member of Congress might be able to sue to de-
fend his personal interest in holding his seat in Congress.  Id. at 820–21 (discussing Pow-
ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 512–14 (1969) (holding that a member of Congress 
could sue to challenge his exclusion from the House of Representatives and his loss of his 
salary)). 
 47 Id. at 829 (stating that the appellees have not alleged any injury to themselves). 
 48 See id. at 829–30 (rejecting standing for individual members of Congress, but observing 
that both houses opposed their suit against the Line Item Veto Act); U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67–69, 71–72 (D.D.C. 2015) (interpreting the 
Raines decision); Mank, supra note 3, at 25. 
 49 Raines, 521 U.S. at 821–29; Mank, supra note 3, at 25.  But cf. Nash, supra note 3, at 351–53 
(arguing that Raines read Coleman narrowly, and that Raines even suggested that Coleman 
might not apply to standing for congressional suits, but also suggested that congressional 
institutional standing might be valid). 
 50 Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (footnote omitted).  In footnote eight of the Raines decision, the 
Court explained that it was not deciding whether Coleman could be distinguished neither 
on the grounds that the Court in Coleman viewed what it concluded to be the senators’ in-
terest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes as a basis for invoking federal inter-
est,  nor on the grounds that Coleman did not involve the separation-of-powers issues in-
volved in congressional suits.  Id. at 824–25 n.8. 
 51 Id. at 826; Mank, supra note 3, at 25–26. 
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allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed (contra, Coleman)”.52  
Moreover, the Raines decision justified the denial of standing for 
members of Congress on the grounds that Congress could simply re-
peal the disputed statute or exempt appropriations bills from its ap-
plication; the Court emphasized that its decision does not address the 
question of whether Congress or a member of Congress has standing 
when it cannot repeal the disputed statute.53  Accordingly, the Raines 
decision usually prevents suits by individual members of Congress 
who allege that a statute has diminished the institutional authority of 
the legislative branch, especially where Congress may simply repeal a 
disputed statute.54 
Raines, nevertheless, potentially allows the possibility of a suit chal-
lenging whether a federal statute is an effective law or not, similar to 
the Coleman decision.  However, the Raines decision explicitly de-
clined to address whether a suit comparable to Coleman can be filed 
by members of or a house of Congress. It also declined to explicitly 
address whether such a suit would be barred by separation-of-powers 
concerns or other factors not applicable to Coleman, which involved 
state legislators.55  The Raines decision did not consider suits where 
Congress or a house of Congress argues that executive action has ar-
guably diminished Congress’s institutional authority, which is dis-
cussed in Parts IV and V.56  The Raines decision also failed to consider 
cases where a plurality of Congress might have grounds to challenge 
an action that requires a two-thirds supermajority of Congress or a 
house of Congress, such as approval of a treaty by the U.S. Senate.57 
After the Raines decision, lower courts have rejected suits by indi-
vidual legislators that allege that an executive official has improperly 
implemented a law, but individual legislators still may be able to sue if 
they allege, as in Coleman, that an executive officer has interfered with 
the legislative process so as to raise questions whether a law was valid-
ly enacted.58  For instance, in Russell v. DeJongh, a senator in the Virgin 
 
 52 Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. 
 53 Id. at 829–30; Mank, supra note 3, at 26. 
 54 Mank, supra note 3, at 26. 
 55 Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8 (declining to decide whether a suit by federal legislators simi-
lar to Coleman would be appropriate); Mank, supra note 3, at 26. 
 56 See Nash, supra note 3, at 376–78 (criticizing Raines for failing to consider congressional 
challenges involving issues other than vote nullification); infra Parts IV and V. 
 57 See Nash, supra note 3, at 376–77 (noting that Raines does not account for likely scenarios 
in which Congress should have standing but are obstructed under the holding). 
 58 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying Raines’s approach 
of denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress in a case alleging the 
President violated the War Powers Act because members have a legislative remedy and 
therefore do not need to sue in federal court); Mank, supra note 3, at 26; see also Cheno-
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Islands territorial legislature sued to void certain judicial commissions 
because the Governor had allegedly failed to follow proper appoint-
ment procedures.59  Dismissing the case for lack of standing, the 
Third Circuit explained the difference between cases like Raines that 
deny legislative standing and Coleman’s recognition of standing: 
The courts have drawn a distinction . . . between a public official’s mere 
disobedience of a law for which a legislator voted—which is not an injury 
in fact—and an official’s “distortion of the process by which a bill be-
comes law” by nullifying a legislator’s vote or depriving a legislator of an 
opportunity to vote—which is an injury in fact.60 
Furthermore, the Third Circuit interpreted the Coleman exception for 
legislative standing as applying to only cases where legislators had no 
effective political remedy, such as a President’s decision to terminate 
a treaty, or at least where a supermajority was needed to overturn an 
executive decision.61  On the other hand, similar to Raines, the Virgin 
Islands’ “Legislature was free to confirm, reject, or defer voting on 
the Governor’s nominees,” and, accordingly, there was no compelling 
reason to allow a legislative member to sue in court when the political 
process could provide an effective remedy.62 
3.  Pocket Veto Cases 
In pocket veto63 cases addressing whether a President’s or territo-
rial governor’s inaction causes a bill to become a law or not to be-
come a law, lower courts have followed Coleman’s approach to find 
legislative standing, although the Supreme Court has never resolved 
the issue.64  In Kennedy v. Sampson, a pre-Raines decision, Congress 
 
weth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113–17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying Raines’s approach of 
denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress in a case alleging the 
President’s executive order for the protection of rivers exceeded his authority and dimin-
ished congressional authority); see also Greene, supra note 33, at 584–85 (discussing the 
reasoning behind Raines and Chenoweth in light of the Coleman holding). 
 59 491 F.3d 130, 131–33 (3d Cir. 2007); Mank, supra note 3, at 26–27. 
 60 Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d, 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 61 Id. at 135–36 (explaining that a key feature of Coleman and several lower-court cases was 
that “the challenged actions in those cases left the plaintiffs with no effective remedies in 
the political process”); Mank, supra note 3, at 27. 
 62 Russell, 491 F.3d at 136; Mank, supra note 3, at 27. 
 63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 implicitly gives the President the authority to pocket veto legisla-
tion in certain circumstances where Congress is adjourned: 
 If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it 
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, 
unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a 
Law. 
 64 See Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 542–47 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Coleman 
decision to hold that the Governor of Guam had standing to challenge the Guam Su-
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passed a bill that President Richard Nixon neither signed nor formal-
ly vetoed, but he had issued a memorandum of disapproval that stat-
ed his decision not to sign the bill in an implied effort to pocket veto 
the bill under Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution.65  Citing 
Coleman, the D.C. Circuit held that Senator Edward Kennedy had 
standing to determine whether the bill had become law: 
In the present case, appellee has alleged that conduct by officials of the 
Executive branch amounted to an illegal nullification not only of Con-
gress’ exercise of its power, but also of appellee’s exercise of his power.  
In the language of the Coleman opinion, appellee’s object in this lawsuit is 
to vindicate the effectiveness of his vote.  No more essential interest 
could be asserted by a legislator.  We are satisfied, therefore, that the 
purposes of the standing doctrine are fully served in this litigation.66 
In 1999, the D.C. Circuit in Chenoweth v. Clinton addressed wheth-
er the Kennedy decision was still good law in light of the Raines deci-
sion and other decisions restricting the scope of Article III standing.67  
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Kennedy “may survive as a peculiar 
application of the narrow rule announced in Coleman.”68  The Cheno-
weth decision explained: 
Although Coleman could be interpreted more broadly, the Raines 
Court read the case to stand only for the proposition that “legislators 
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific leg-
islative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect 
(or does not go into effect) on the ground that their votes have been 
completely nullified.” . . . Even under this narrow interpretation, one 
could argue that the plaintiff in Kennedy had standing.  The pocket veto 
challenged in that case had made ineffective a bill that both houses of 
the Congress had approved.  Because it was the President’s veto—not a 
lack of legislative support—that prevented the bill from becoming law 
(either directly or by the Congress voting to override the President’s ve-
 
preme Court decision that his failure to sign a bill resulted in a pocket veto preventing 
the bill from becoming law); see also Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116–17 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (concluding that prior D.C. Circuit cases finding legislative standing in pocket 
veto cases are probably still good law because they are controlled by Coleman decision); see 
also Greene, supra note 33, at 586–88 (arguing that pocket veto cases fall within Coleman’s 
legislative standing rule); Mank, supra note 3, at 27–29. 
 65 511 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (holding that individual members of Congress and congressional leaders had 
standing in a pocket veto case).  Congress had adjourned within eight days of the bill’s 
passage, but the Senate appointed an agent to take messages from the president to avoid 
a pocket veto.  Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 66 Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436. 
 67 181 F.3d at 114–17; Mank, supra note 3, at 28–29. 
 68 Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 116. 
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to), those in the majority could plausibly describe the President’s action 
as a complete nullification of their votes.69 
In pocket veto cases, individual legislators may be able to sue to de-
termine, as in Coleman, whether a law was effectively ratified by the 
legislator or nullified by the President or governor.70 
4.  Institutional Authority Cases, Especially Congressional Subpoenas 
Several decisions in the D.C. Circuit have concluded or suggested 
that a house of Congress or its committees has standing to sue to pro-
tect the institutional authority of Congress or that house, especially in 
cases involving congressional subpoenas.71  Professor Jonathan Remy 
Nash agrees that Congress generally has standing to seek information 
because obtaining such information is central to its legislative over-
sight, voting, and drafting functions.72  He explains that a functional-
ist approach to standing, including the need of Congress to gather 
information, is more likely to support congressional standing than a 
formalist approach to standing that favors traditional common law 
adjudication and avoids having courts resolve intra-branch disputes 
between Congress and the President.73  Addressing the more difficult 
question of congressional suits challenging the executive’s nonde-
fense or nonenforcement of laws, however, Professor Stern argues 
that “the scholarly debate over congressional standing to enforce or 
 
 69 Id. at 116–17; see also Nash, supra note 3, at 360–61 (arguing that even if Kennedy and 
Coleman survive according to the Chenoweth decision, that decision took a narrow view of 
when Congress has standing to challenge executive branch actions). 
 70 Mank, supra note 3, at 27–29 (discussing the foundation set by Coleman for courts to ana-
lyze legislative standing in pocket veto cases). 
 71 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67–68, 78 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(outlining recent District of Columbia cases, many of which held in favor of legislative 
standing). 
 72 Nash, supra note 3, at 343, 358, 363–67, 373–75, 388 (“Beyond the Court’s narrow con-
struction of congressional function in Raines, Congress gathers information, and there-
fore should have standing to vindicate that information-gathering function.”).  While the 
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly authorize Congress’s authority to hold hearings and 
gather information, the Supreme Court has recognized the power of Congress to conduct 
investigations based upon practices dating to the early days of the Republic, as well as in 
colonial legislatures and the British Parliament.  Id. at 363–65; see also McGrain v. Daugh-
erty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1927) (recognizing the authority of Congress to hold 
hearings and take testimony based on historical record and functional reasons rather 
than on set provisions). 
 73 Nash, supra note 3, at 363–75.  Professor Nash acknowledges that the Raines decision was 
“unnecessarily stingy in its understanding of congressional function,” but argues that the 
view that the Raines decision calls “into question constitutional standing when a congres-
sional committee enforces a subpoena against an executive branch actor, but not other-
wise, is implausible.”  Id. at 369–75. 
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defend federal statutes has pitted formalists categorically opposing 
such standing against functionalists who view Congress’s ability to 
bring suit in certain circumstances as a necessary mechanism to pre-
vent executive arrogation of power,” that the Supreme Court has tak-
en a “hybrid” or inconsistent approach combining elements of for-
malism and functionalism in its separation-of-powers decisions, that 
the Court has avoided firmly deciding congressional standing issues 
because of the tension between its formalist and functionalist deci-
sions, but that the Court is unlikely to recognize legislative challenges 
to a President’s failure to defend or enforce a federal statute.74 
In United States v. AT&T, the D.C. Circuit held that the House of 
Representatives had standing to sue in an official capacity to demand 
information from the executive branch pursuant to Congress’s inves-
tigatory powers,75 although the court remanded the case back to the 
district court and urged the executive and legislative branches to set-
tle a difficult case.76  The functionalist approach to congressional 
standing underlies the AT&T decision, which involved a dispute over 
congressional subpoenas that sought to compel information from 
AT&T related to warrantless wiretaps that the executive branch re-
fused to release for national security reasons.77  The D.C. Circuit con-
cluded it had federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case,78 and 
also held that it was “clear that the House as a whole has standing to 
assert its investigatory power, and can designate a member to act on 
its behalf.”79  The AT&T decision determined that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in U.S. v. Nixon,80 which had involved an “analogous 
conflict between the executive and judicial branches and stands for 
the justiciability of such a case,” had “establish[ed], at a minimum, 
that the mere fact that there is a conflict between the legislative and 
executive branches . . . does not preclude judicial resolution of the 
conflict.”81  However, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case because it 
determined that the complicated national security questions involved 
 
 74 Stern, supra note 25, at 51–58. 
 75 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  Although formally designated as a lawsuit between 
the United States and AT&T, the latter’s only interest was “to determine its legal duty” 
under a congressional subpoena that the executive had advised it to ignore.  Id. at 385, 
388–89. 
 76 Id. at 385, 391–95. 
 77 Id. at 385–88. 
 78 Id. at 388–89. 
 79 Id. at 391. 
 80 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 81 AT&T, 551 F.2d at 390 (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities 
v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
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required more fact finding by the district court before courts could 
resolve the political question justiciability issues raised, and it urged 
the executive and legislative branches to settle the difficult questions 
in the case.82 
Several more recent decisions in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia have followed the AT&T decision’s approach in 
finding that a house or a congressional committee has standing or ju-
risdiction to sue the executive branch to seek information from the 
executive branch pursuant to its investigatory powers.  In Committee on 
Oversight & Government Reform v. Holder, the district court found that 
“neither the Constitution nor prudential considerations require 
judges to stand on the sidelines.  There is federal subject matter ju-
risdiction over this complaint, and it alleges a cause of action that 
plaintiff has standing to bring.”83  The court cited the AT&T decision, 
the Nixon decision, and a district court decision in Committee on the Ju-
diciary v. Miers,84 which is discussed below, for the proposition that 
federal courts may resolve disputes between the political branches 
over congressional requests for information.85  The Committee on Over-
sight & Government Reform decision distinguished the Raines decision 
as involving only individual members of Congress and not the institu-
tional interests of a duly authorized committee of Congress.86  Fur-
thermore, while it raised concerns about the potential “problems that 
could arise if individual executive officials or Members of Congress 
were to challenge the merits of decisions committed to the other 
branch of government in a lawsuit,” the district court in Committee on 
Oversight & Goverment Reform concluded that the Raines decision had 
not decided whether Congress may sue to protect its institutional in-
terests.87 
In Committee on the Judiciary, the district court held that the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, which was acting on behalf of the entire 
House of Representatives, had standing to bring a civil action to en-
force congressional subpoenas issued to senior presidential aides.88  
The court relied upon the AT&T decision and concluded that case 
“survive[d]” the Raines decision.89  The district court distinguished its 
 
 82 AT&T, 551 F.2d at 390–95. 
 83 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 84 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 85 See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 4, 9–12, 16 (citing AT&T, Nixon, 
and Committee on the Judiciary). 
 86 Id. at 13–14. 
 87 Id. (discussing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828–30 (1997)). 
 88 558 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56, 67–71. 
 89 Id. at 67–71. 
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facts involving an institutional injury from the suits filed by individual 
members of Congress in Raines:90  “But the Court has never held that 
an institution, such as the House of Representatives, cannot file suit 
to address an institutional harm.   Because the issues presented by 
Raines and [AT&T] were not the same, one cannot conclude that 
Raines overruled or undermined [AT&T].”91  Furthermore, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary decision reasoned that both its case and the 
AT&T decision involved concrete issues involving the enforcement of 
congressional subpoenas, whereas “the purported injury [in Raines] 
was wholly hypothetical.”92  Accordingly, the district court in Committee 
on the Judiciary held that a House committee had standing to sue to 
enforce congressional subpoenas issued to senior presidential aides.93 
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Department of Commerce, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia concluded “that [the 
House of Representatives] has properly alleged a judicially cognizable 
injury through its right to receive information by statute and through 
the institutional interest in its lawful composition” when it sued to ob-
tain census information guaranteed to it by a statute and “necessary 
to perform a constitutionally mandated function” in apportioning the 
number of members to each state.94  The court held that the House of 
Representatives suffered a concrete and particularized informational 
injury when the President and the Census Bureau failed to provide 
information about statistical sampling techniques used by the Bureau 
in the 2000 Census that a statute required the executive branch to 
provide to Congress.95  The court distinguished the Raines decision as 
involving a suit by individual legislators and not involving the institu-
tional interest of the House in how the Census is counted for purpos-
es of apportioning seats in that body.96  The court explained: “And, 
the institutional interest is not widely dispersed [as it was in Raines]; it 
is particularized to the House of Representatives because the House’s 
composition will be affected by the manner in which the Bureau 
conducts the Census.”97  Thus, in the D.C. Circuit, both the AT&T 
decision and at least three district court decisions support the institu-
tional authority of Congress, a house of Congress, or a duly author-
ized committee to receive information pursuant to valid subpoenas or 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 70. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 67–71. 
 94 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85–87 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 89–90. 
 97 Id. at 89. 
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other appropriate statutory rights.98  Furthermore, four district deci-
sions, including Judge Collyer’s recent decision regarding the Af-
fordable Care Act, agreed that the D.C. Circuit’s AT&T decision 
“survives Raines.”99 
B.  Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission 
The most recent Supreme Court decision on legislative standing is 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commis-
sion.100  The Arizona state legislature filed suit challenging Proposition 
106, a statewide citizen’s initiative that assigned congressional redis-
tricting authority to an independent commission instead of the legis-
lature.101  The Arizona legislature contended that Proposition 106 vio-
lated the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause,102 which gives state 
legislatures “primary responsibility” over congressional redistricting 
decisions.103  The Supreme Court concluded that the Arizona legisla-
ture had standing to sue because Proposition 106 “strip[ped] the leg-
islature of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting,” and, there-
fore, that the legislature had alleged a sufficient injury in fact for 
Article III standing.104 
The Arizona State Legislature decision distinguished the Raines case 
by emphasizing its narrow holding “that six individual Members of 
Congress lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act” and 
that “[t]he ‘institutional injury’ at issue, we reasoned, scarcely zeroed 
in on any individual Member.”105  The Arizona State Legislature opinion 
 
 98 See id. at 86 (discussing cases recognizing the authority of a house of Congress or congres-
sional committee to issue valid subpoenas or obtain information in support of its institu-
tional investigatory powers); supra Part II.A.4. 
 99 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 68 (citing Department of 
Commerce, Commission on Oversight & Government Reform, and Committee on the Judiciary); su-
pra Part II.A.4. 
100 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
101 Id. at 2658–59, 2661. 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof 
. . . .”). 
103 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 51–3, Ariz. State 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015) (No. 13-
1314)). 
104 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663.  On the merits, a divided Court determined 
that Proposition 106’s creation of a state redistricting commission did not violate the 
Constitution’s Elections Clause.  Id. at 2671–77. 
105 Id. at 2664 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)); accord Nash, supra note 3, 
at 353 (arguing that the Arizona State Legislature decision distinguished Raines); see also 
Raines, 521 U.S. at 813–14, 821, 830); id. at 2664..  
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emphasized that there was “some importance to the fact that [the 
Raines plaintiffs had] not been authorized to represent their respec-
tive Houses of Congress.”106  By contrast, the Arizona legislature was 
“an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury.” 107 
The Arizona State Legislature decision reasoned that the Coleman 
decision, which had recognized legislative standing, was “[c]loser to 
the mark” of the facts in its case.108  The Raines decision had ex-
plained the Coleman decision as standing “‘for the proposition that 
legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) 
a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action 
goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their 
votes have been completely nullified.’”109  The Arizona State Legislature 
decision concluded that the Arizona legislature had Article III stand-
ing because “Proposition 106, together with the Arizona Constitu-
tion’s ban on efforts to undermine the purposes of an initia-
tive . . . would ‘completely nullif[y]’ any vote by the legislature, now 
or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a redistricting plan,” and, 
therefore, made the case similar to Coleman as the case was interpret-
ed in Raines.110  The Arizona State Legislature opinion explicitly avoided 
the issue of whether Congress, a house of Congress, or a congression-
al committee has standing to sue the President: “The case before us 
does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has stand-
ing to bring a suit against the President.  There is no federal ana-
logue to Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and 
the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent 
here.”111 
III.  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES V. BURWELL 
In her 2015 opinion in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 
Judge Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
held that the House of Representatives had Article III standing to 
challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act as violations 
of the U.S. Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, which requires that 
all federal government spending occur only if Congress appropriates 
 
106 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829) (alteration in 
original). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 2665. 
109 Id. (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823). 
110 Id. (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24). 
111 Id. at 2665 n.12; accord Nash, supra note 3, at 353 (arguing that the Arizona State Legislature 
decision avoided the issue of congressional standing). 
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those public funds through authorizing legislation.112  The House in 
its suit argued that Sylvia Burwell, the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services, Jacob Lew, the Secretary of the Treasury, and their re-
spective departments had spent billions of unappropriated dollars to 
support the ACA in violation of the Clause.113  The ACA provides sev-
eral types of subsidies, including two relevant to the lawsuit.114  First, 
to assist certain individuals with the cost of insurance on the statute’s 
exchanges, Congress in Section 1401 of the ACA “enacted a ‘premi-
um tax credit’ under the Internal Revenue Code for coverage of stat-
utory beneficiaries with household incomes from 100% to 400% of 
the federal poverty level.”115  Second, Section 1402 of the ACA in-
cludes “‘cost-sharing’ provisions [that] require insurance companies 
that offer qualified health plans through the ACA to reduce the out-
of-pocket cost of insurance coverage for policyholders who qualify.”116  
“The federal government then offsets the added costs to insurance 
companies by reimbursing them with funds from the Treasury.”117 
The House alleged that the executive branch’s funding of Section 
1402 violated the Appropriations Clause.118  The House maintained 
that Section 1401 tax credits were legitimately funded by a perma-
nent appropriation in the Internal Revenue Code.119  However, the 
House contended that “Section 1402 Cost-Sharing Offsets must be 
funded and re-funded by annual, current appropriations,” and that 
Congress had not appropriated any funds of any type to make any 
Section 1402 payments to insurance companies.120  Despite Congress’s 
refusal to fund the Section 1402 offsets through a current appropria-
tion, the House alleged that the Secretaries spent public monies on 
that program beginning in January 2014.121 
 
112 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57–59, 74–76 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(concluding that the House had standing to sue, in the context of a case involving a chal-
lenge to the federal government’s alleged spending of unappropriated funds). 
113 Id. at 57. 
114 Id. at 59–60. 
115 Id. at 59 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii)(III) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081, 18082 
(2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015)) (describing the refundable tax 
credits provided under the Act and the category of individuals that qualify for them). 
116 U.S. House of Represenatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18071).  
117 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(3)(A)) (“An issuer of a qualified health plan making 
reductions under this subsection shall notify the Secretary of such reductions and the 
Secretary shall make periodic and timely payments to the issuer equal to the value of the 
reductions.”). 
118 U.S. House of Represenatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 60. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 60–62. 
121 Id. at 63. 
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The House relied upon the Coleman decision in arguing that it 
had standing as an institution to determine whether the Secretaries 
had disrupted the legislative process by spending money without a 
current appropriation.122  The House invoked Coleman to distinguish 
between legislative standing in a case ascertaining whether the execu-
tive had interfered with the legislative process in contrast to more 
questionable suits challenging the executive’s implementation or in-
terpretation of a law.123  By contrast, the Secretaries relied primarily 
upon Raines in arguing against legislative standing in the case by con-
tending that the House has alleged only an “‘abstract dilution of insti-
tutional legislative power.’”124 
The district court followed the AT&T decision and the three dis-
trict court decisions that had found congressional standing in cases in 
which Congress, a house of Congress, or a committee sought infor-
mation through a subpoena or pursuant to a statute.125  Furthermore, 
the district court interpreted the Arizona State Legislature decision as 
limiting the scope of the Raines decision to suits involving individual 
legislators and not to suits by a legislature as an institution, although 
the court acknowledged that the Arizona State Legislature case had ex-
plicitly avoided the question of congressional standing in suits against 
the President.126  The district court conceded that it was addressing an 
issue of first impression because “no case has decided whether this 
institutional plaintiff has standing on facts such as these.”127 
The district court concluded that the House had standing to chal-
lenge the Secretaries’ alleged violation of the Appropriations Clause 
by spending “billions of dollars without a valid appropriation, in di-
rect contravention of” the clause.128  The court rejected the executive 
branch’s argument that Congress does not have standing to chal-
lenge how the executive implements, interprets or executes a statute 
because the House’s Appropriation Clause claim had nothing to do 
with the three types of executive action supposedly exempt from leg-
islative suits.129  The district court explained that: 
[T[he Non–Appropriation Theory is not about the implementation, in-
terpretation, or execution of any federal statute.  It is a complaint that 
 
122 Id. at 66–67. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 67 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997)). 
125 Id. at 67–68. 
126 Id. at 68–69 (citing Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652, 2664–65 n.12 (2015)). 
127 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 69. 
128 Id. at 69–75. 
129 Id. at 70–73, 75. 
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the Executive has drawn funds from the Treasury without a congressional 
appropriation—not in violation of any statute, but in violation of Article 
I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution.  The Non–Appropriation Theory, in other 
words, is not about how Section 1402 is being applied, but rather how it 
is funded.130 
The district court’s view that the House may challenge the funding of 
a statute under the Appropriations Clause negated the executive 
branch’s arguments that Congress does not have standing to chal-
lenge how a statute is implemented by executive officials.131 
The district court determined that the House had a particularized 
injury in fact for standing because “Congress (of which the House 
and Senate are equal) is the only body empowered by the Constitu-
tion to adopt laws directing monies to be spent from the U.S. Treas-
ury.”132  The court reasoned that the Appropriation Clause’s vesting of 
control of federal expenditures in Congress could be nullified if the 
executive could spend money without authorization.133  The only 
means to protect the congressional power of the purse was to author-
ize Congress or a house of Congress to sue to enforce the clause.134 
The district court rejected the Secretaries’ argument that “vindica-
tion of the rule of law” is too generalized a grievance to be adjudicat-
ed by an Article III court.135  The executive branch had relied on 
Raines for the principle that legislators cannot sue over an abstract di-
lution of congressional institutional authority.136  However, the district 
court rejected the executive branch’s analogy to Raines because that 
decision involved a suit by only six individual legislators who could 
not assert institutional interests rather than an entire house of Con-
gress as in its case.137  The court reasoned that the House’s suit over 
appropriations was more comparable to the Arizona legislature’s in-
stitutional suit in Arizona State Legislature where the Court had recog-
nized legislative standing.138  Furthermore, the House has an institu-
tional interest in protecting its role in the appropriations process as 
defined in the Constitution that is distinct from any injury to the pub-
 
130 Id. at 70 (footnote omitted). 
131 Id. at 70–73.  But see Zachary Cheslock, Taking on the President: An Uphill Battle for House 
Republicans, 47 TOL. L. REV. 159, 169–70 (2015) (arguing that Congress does not have 
standing to challenge President Obama’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act be-
cause Congress could amend or repeal the statute). 
132 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 71. 
133 Id. at 71, 73. 
134 Id. at 73–74. 
135 Id. at 71–72, 74–75. 
136 Id. at 71–72. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at  71–72. 
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lic at large.139  Moreover, the court reasoned that the alleged constitu-
tional violation could not be resolved by ordinary political methods 
without a lawsuit because the House asserted that the executive was 
able to circumvent Congress’s alleged denial of funding for Section 
1402 offsets by obtaining money from other sources.140 
The court determined that the House “as an institution would suf-
fer a concrete, particularized injury if the Executive were able to draw 
funds from the Treasury without a valid appropriation.  The House 
therefore has standing to sue on its Non-Appropriation Theory, to 
the extent that it seeks to remedy constitutional violations.”141  The 
court interpreted the Appropriations Clause to require Congress to 
appropriate all federal funds, and, therefore, to establish an injury to 
Congress or house of Congress whenever the executive spent such 
monies without congressional authorization.142  The court concluded 
that “[d]isregard” for constitutional limitations on the executive’s 
ability to spend monies without congressional control over spending 
“works a grievous harm on the House, which is deprived of its rightful 
and necessary place under our Constitution.  The House has standing 
to redress that injury in federal court.”143  Finally, the court reasoned 
that the separation-of-powers concerns raised by the executive did 
not preclude the court from deciding the constitutional issues in the 
case.144  The court stated: “Despite its potential political ramifications, 
this suit remains a plain dispute over a constitutional command, of 
which the Judiciary has long been the ultimate interpreter.”145 
However, Judge Collyer concluded that the House did not have 
standing to challenge the Treasury’s alleged changes to the start date 
of the statute’s employer mandate and the percentage of employees 
who must be offered insurance by employers.146  She declined to rec-
 
139 Id. at 72–75. 
140 Id. at 73–77. 
141 Id. at 74.  The district court rejected other counts of the complaint that essentially alleged 
that the executive’s implementation of the statute had violated certain provisions in the 
statute, because the Constitution does not envision legislative supervision of executive of-
ficers and the appropriations process could remedy the alleged statutory issues without a 
lawsuit, presuming that the appropriation process itself was not being violated in contra-
diction of the Constitution.  Id. at 74–76. 
142 Id. at 73–77. 
143 Id. at 77. 
144 Id. at 79–80.  But see Stern, supra note 25, at 3–4, 42–56 (arguing that separation-of-powers 
and political-question doctrine concerns make it unlikely that the Supreme Court will 
recognize congressional standing, but acknowledging that the law is not absolutely clear 
on this issue). 
145 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (citing Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
146 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 58, 74–76. 
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ognize congressional standing in cases where a President has alleged-
ly misinterpreted, misapplied, or declined to enforce a statute be-
cause to allow congressional suits over possible statutory violations 
would result in far more potential suits than legislative standing lim-
ited to alleged constitutional violations, and because private litigants 
would be able to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act to chal-
lenge the Treasury’s regulations under the ACA.147  Both scholars and 
members of the Court have debated whether Congress may ever have 
standing to challenge a President’s non-enforcement or misinterpre-
tation of a statute, and most have recognized that courts must be ex-
tremely cautious in allowing legislative suits because federal courts 
should not routinely referee political disputes between the legislative 
and executive branches.148  Part V will examine Justice Scalia’s and 
Justice Samuel Alito’s differing views on the appropriateness of con-
gressional standing when a President declines to enforce a federal 
statute.149 
Critics of the Burwell decision’s recognition of congressional 
standing argue that the case is essentially about the interpretation of 
whether Section 1402 constitutes a permanent appropriation or re-
quires annual appropriations.150  They agree with the Obama Admin-
istration that Congress does not have standing to challenge how a 
statute is implemented by executive officials.151  However, Professor 
 
147 Id. at 75–76. 
148 Compare Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 573–76, 625–30 (arguing that Article II grants 
the executive branch the exclusive authority to defend federal statutes in court, thus pre-
cluding congressional standing and barring Congress from intervening, even when the 
president refuses to enforce a law), with Pickett, supra note 31, at 468–75 (arguing that 
Congress should have institutional standing when a president refuses to enforce a federal 
statute).  See generally Stern, supra note 25, at 11–16 (discussing competing scholarly views 
on the issue of congressional standing). 
149 See infra Part V. 
150 Nicholas Bagley, Oh Boy.  Here We Go Again, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2015, 
9:34 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/oh-boy-here-we-go-again (crit-
icizing Judge Collyer’s view that the President’s alleged violation of the Appropriations 
Clause provides sufficient grounds for a federal lawsuit, and arguing that that this con-
ception, if accepted, “would mark an unprecedented expansion of judicial authority into 
interbranch food fights”); Walter Dellinger, Opinion, House Republicans’ Misguided 
Obamacare Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-houses-misguided-obamacare-
lawsuit/2015/08/16 (arguing that permitting the House to file suit in federal court be-
cause it does not agree with the President’s interpretation of the congressionally enacted 
statute at issue would lead to an unprecedented expansion of the authority of federal 
judges). 
151 Bagley, supra note 150 (arguing that Judge Collyer’s ruling constitutes “a radicial position 
[that] is untenable” and should be overturned on appeal); Cheslock, supra note 131, at 
169–70 (arguing that the fact that Congress has alternative remedies to litigation at its 
 
Oct. 2016] DOES A HOUSE OF CONGRESS HAVE STANDING? 165 
 
Jonathan Adler argues that Judge Collyer’s theory of standing in the 
case is defensible, although he is not fully convinced by the “novel 
and largely unprecedented standing claim.”152  He points out that 
when a federal district court considers a motion to dismiss it must as-
sume the facts argued by the plaintiff, and that the House alleges that 
the Obama Administration has spent billions of dollars without its 
approval.153  If the House’s allegations are true, Adler contends the 
executive branch’s actions are “egregious,” are more than a “simple 
dispute over statutory interpretation,” and arguably entitle the House 
to have standing to prevent executive abuse of its legislative authority 
over appropriations.154  In 2016, Judge Collyer held on the merits that 
the Secretaries violated the Appropriations Clause, Article I, Sec-
tion 9, clause 7, in using unappropriated monies to fund reimburse-
ments due to insurers under Section 1402, but the court stayed its in-
junction pending appeal by either or both parties.155 
IV.  IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE V. CHADHA 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Chadha156 is an important constitutional precedent because of 
its merits holding that separation-of-powers principles in the Consti-
tution prohibit Congress from delegating a power to the executive 
branch, but then authorizing one or both houses of Congress to ex-
ercise a legislative veto to override that executive decision without go-
ing through the mandated bicameral presentment process and veto 
 
disposal through which it can oppose the ACA establishes that its challenge represents a 
purely political question and that it has not legitimately suffered an injury); Dellinger, su-
pra note 150, at 1 (asserting that granting the House standing to sue the executive branch 
over interpretations of statutes would be an inapproporiate and radical expansion of au-
thority). 
152 Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, House Obamacare Suit Clears First Major Hurdle (in Part), 
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/09/10/house-obamacare-suit-clears-first-major-hurdle-in-
part/?utm_term=.f3227a3ccee2 (explaining the House’s argument for standing, while 
finding part of its argument unconvincing). 
153 Id. (noting that, on its review of the motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing in 
the case at bar, it was required to assume as fact the House’s allegation “that the Admin-
istration has, in fact, spent money without legislative appropriation”). 
154 Id. 
155 U.S. House of Representatitves v. Burwell, No. CV 14-1967 (RMC), 2016 WL 2750934, at 
*19 (D.D.C. May 12, 2016). 
156 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Mank, supra note 3, at 40–41 (synthesizing the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Chadha); Hall, supra note 30 (explaining the parameters of Congress’s ability to 
assert standing). 
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procedure in the Constitution for enacting legislation.157  However, 
before it could decide the merits, the Court initially had to determine 
the question of standing for Mr. Chadha, the executive branch, and 
Congress.158  The Chadha decision at least implied that Congress had 
standing under the circumstances of a case in which both houses of 
Congress had intervened as parties.159  The Court initially noted that 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had granted the separate motions 
of the House and the Senate to intervene in the case, and that 
“[b]oth Houses are therefore proper ‘parties.’”160  The Court next ob-
served that the case was a “justiciable case or controversy under Art. 
III. . . . because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as ad-
verse parties.”161 
The Chadha decision was different from the legislative standing 
cases in Part II because a central issue here was whether the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (“INS”) had standing to appeal to the 
Supreme Court when it had won a decision in the court of appeals 
that the statute was unconstitutional; that issue received more atten-
tion from the Court than whether Congress had standing.162  “Both 
Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought 
from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore 
cannot appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals.”163  The 
Chadha decision, however, held “that the INS was sufficiently ag-
grieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking 
action it would otherwise take” to be a party for appellate jurisdiction 
because the executive branch would have enforced a decision of the 
House to deport Mr. Chadha even though the executive argued that 
the legislative veto requiring it to deport him was unconstitutional.164  
 
157 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944–59 (noting that Congress had authorized Immigration and 
Naturalization Service judges to waive the deportation of certain aliens whose visas had 
expired in cases of hardship, but nevertheless concluding that the statute had violated the 
separation-of-powers doctrine by granting Congress the authority to override such waivers 
without affording the President his constitutional authority to veto any legislative over-
ride). 
158 See id. at 929–44 (determining that Mr. Chadha had standing to challenge the legislative 
veto provision at issue, despite Congress’s several objections). 
159 Id. at 931 n.6 (finding that the presence of the two houses of Congress appearing as ad-
verse parties in the case satisfied the Article III requirement that an appeal present a jus-
ticiable case or controversy). 
160 Id. at 930 n.5 . 
161 Id. at 931 n.6 . 
162 Id. at 929–44 (confirming that the INS had standing to appeal the case to the Supreme 
Court). 
163 Id. at 930. 
164 Id. at 930 (describing the process that the INS and Mr. Chadha followed in challenging 
the constitutionality of the legislative veto). 
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The Chadha decision implied that both the executive branch and 
Congress had standing in the case when it stated that “[t]he conten-
tions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined, and 
[the Court is] satisfied the parties are properly before [it].”165  The 
Chadha decision also stated that any prudential concerns in the case 
regarding whether there was an adversary arguing in favor of the 
statute’s constitutionality were satisfied when the Court of Appeals 
had “invit[ed] and accept[ed] briefs from both Houses of Con-
gress.”166  Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that the interven-
tion of Congress was appropriate under the circumstances of a case in 
which the executive refused to defend the constitutionality of a stat-
ute.167  “We have long held that Congress is the proper party to de-
fend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a de-
fendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that 
the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”168 
However, by the time that the Windsor case was decided in 2013, 
thirty years after Chadha, the Court did not explicitly recognize stand-
ing for Congress, but did allow amicus briefs filed by one house of 
Congress to tip the scales in favor of justiciability in a case where the 
executive refused to defend the constitutionality of a statute.169 
V.  UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR 
A.  Overview of Windsor 
The law is unclear whether Congress or a house of Congress has 
Article III standing to intervene in a lawsuit to defend the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute in the rare170 case that a president refuses 
to defend such a statute.171  In its 2013 decision United States v. Wind-
 
165 Id. at 943. 
166 Id. at 940. 
167 Id. at 940 (affirming Congress’s prerogative to defend the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto before the courts). 
168 Id. 
169 See infra Part V.B. 
170 See The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 
25 (1981) (“The Department appropriately refuses to defend an act of Congress only in 
the rare case when the statute either infringes on the constitutional power of the Execu-
tive or when prior precedent overwhelmingly indicates that the statute is invalid.”); Melt-
zer, supra note 33, at 1198 (“[O]ne can say in general that refusals by the executive 
branch to defend or enforce acts of Congress are extraordinarily rare.  But they do occur 
. . . .”). 
171 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013) (“The Department of Justice 
did not oppose limited intervention by BLAG.  The District Court denied BLAG’s motion 
to enter the suit as of right, on the rationale that the United States already was represent-
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sor,172 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of Section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).173  President Obama’s 
administration refused to defend the constitutionality of DOMA, but 
continued to enforce the statute as a means to create a judicial con-
troversy so federal appeals courts might review the constitutionality of 
the statute.174  It was uncertain whether an appeal was appropriate in 
the case after a district court held the statute was unconstitutional 
and the executive concurred with the trial court’s decision.175  The 
Obama Administration argued that the leadership of the House of 
Representatives could file amicus briefs in support of DOMA, but also 
contended that the executive branch alone had exclusive authority to 
defend federal statutes even if Congress or a house of Congress might 
intervene in a case to file amicus briefs in cases where congressional 
leaders disagree with the executive.176 
 
ed by the Department of Justice.  The District Court, however, did grant intervention by 
BLAG as an interested party.”); Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “the DOJ asks that BLAG’s involvement be limited to mak-
ing substantive arguments in defense of Section 3 of DOMA while the DOJ continues to 
file all procedural notices”); Mank, supra note 3, at 6 (asserting that the Obama Admin-
istration enforced DOMA, despite the Administration’s view that the statute was unconsti-
tutional); Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1210–11 (“The Department of Justice has taken the 
view that only the executive branch may represent the United States in litigation, or . . . 
that any intervention by Congress should be limited to presenting arguments in defense 
of a statute’s constitutionality.”). 
172 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
173 See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (codifying sex-specific stipulations on 
marriage in the United States).  Windsor challenged Section 3 of DOMA, which amended 
the federal definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” in Title 1, § 7 of the United States 
Code so that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the oppo-
site sex who is a husband or a wife.”  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683, 2689–96 (assessing the 
validity of DOMA under the U.S. Constitution). 
174 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–85 (detailing the Obama Administration’s refusal to de-
fend the constitutionality of the act, while continuing to enforce it); see also Mank, supra 
note 3, at 6 (asserting that the Obama Administration still enforced DOMA, despite its 
view that it was unconstitutional); infra Part V.B. 
175 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (analyzing an amicus brief’s suggestion that once the 
executive branch had agreed with Windsor’s position, the two were no longer adverse 
parties and it was therefore improper for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari); Mank, 
supra note 3, at 6 (adding that before the Windsor opinion, it was unclear if an appeal 
from the district court opinion was proper); infra Part V.B. 
176 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (“The Department of Justice did not oppose limited inter-
vention by BLAG.  The District Court denied BLAG’s motion to enter the suit as of right, 
on the rationale that the United States already was represented by the Department of Jus-
tice.  The District Court, however, did grant intervention by BLAG as an interested party.  
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2).”); see also Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24 (stating 
that “the DOJ asks that BLAG’s involvement be limited to making substantive arguments 
in defense of Section 3 of DOMA while the DOJ continues to file all procedural notices”); 
Mank, supra note 3, at 6 (summarizing the executive branch’s argument that it alone has 
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In Windsor, the Court did not directly address whether Congress 
or a house of Congress has standing to defend a federal statute in the 
small number of cases where a president declines to enforce or de-
fend a federal statute.177  Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion 
concluded that the executive branch had standing to appeal the trial 
court’s decision holding that DOMA was unconstitutional because 
the executive continued to enforce the statute when it refused to pay 
a tax refund to the plaintiff.178  Furthermore, Windsor recognized the 
appropriateness of the amicus brief filed by House of Representatives 
leadership supporting the constitutionality of DOMA because that 
brief provided a required adverse party for an appeal in a case where 
the executive agreed with the trial court that DOMA was unconstitu-
tional.179  Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion argued that Congress al-
most never has standing to defend or enforce a federal statute be-
cause Article II’s Take Care Clause gives an almost exclusive role to 
the executive branch to defend federal laws, and contended that no 
party had standing to appeal in Windsor because President Obama’s 
administration agreed with the district court’s decision holding Sec-
tion 3 to be unconstitutional.180  Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s dissent-
 
the authority to defend federal statutes in the courts); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 1210–11 
(“The Department of Justice has taken the view that only the executive branch may repre-
sent the United States in litigation, or . . . . that any intervention by Congress should be 
limited to presenting arguments in defense of a statute’s constitutionality.”). 
177 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685–88 (reasoning that the House of Representatives had stand-
ing despite the executive branch’s refusal to defend the constitutionality of the federal 
statute at issue); Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 622 (observing that Windsor did not 
reach the issue of whether the House had standing); see also Mank, supra note 3, at 5 (not-
ing that one argument in support of the notion that a President has a duty to enforce all 
potentially unconstitutional statutes is because the law is not entirely clear as to whether 
Congress has standing and the authority to intervene in order to defend a statute); infra 
Part V.C. 
178 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (asserting that the executive branch’s refusal to grant the 
sought-after relief provides for a degree of adverseness that is sufficient for purposes of 
establish a justiciable dispute under Article III); see also Mank, supra note 3, at 6–8, 42 
(agreeing with the Supreme Court’s determination in Windsor that the executive branch 
had standing to appeal the lower court’s decision); see infra Part V.C. 
179 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687–89 (finding that the congressional committee’s briefs in Wind-
sor provided an adversarial presentation); see also Mank, supra note 3, at 7–8 (speculating 
that Windsor will pave the way for Congress, or one of its houses, to defend the constitu-
tionality of a statute in the courts when the executive branch refuses to do so); see infra 
Part V.C. 
180 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2698–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the courts can only 
adjudicate cases where the parties are adversaries seeking opposite outcomes through lit-
igation, and since that requirement was not applicable to the parties in Windsor, the case 
should have been dismissed); see infra Part V.D; see also Mank, supra note 3, at 7 n.18 (not-
ing that “Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in full”); id. (explain-
ing that “Chief Justice Roberts joined only the standing portion, Part I, of Scalia’s dissent-
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ing opinion acknowledged the standing of Congress to represent it-
self in separation-of-powers cases involving its core institutional pow-
ers.181  On the other hand, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion sought to 
recognize the standing of a house of Congress to defend a federal 
statute that the president refuses to defend.182 
B.  The Preliminary Stages of the Windsor Litigation 
Scholars disagree whether the president has a duty under Article 
II’s Take Care Clause to enforce a statute the president believes is 
unconstitutional.183  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has acknowl-
edged that the executive branch should routinely defend federal 
statutes and should refuse to do so only in “rare” cases involving laws 
that undermine executive authority or raise serious constitutional 
 
ing opinion, but not his discussion of the merits, as the Chief Justice filed a separate dis-
senting opinion on the merits”); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting) (noting his agreement with Justice Scalia on the point that the Supreme Court 
did not have jurisdiction to review the case). 
181 See id. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[In Chadha] two parties to the litigation disagreed 
with the position of the United States and with the court below: the House and Senate, 
which had intervened in the case.  Because Chadha concerned the validity of a mode of 
congressional action . . . the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what 
they claimed to be one of their institutional powers.”); Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 
623 (observing that none of the Justices in Windsor questioned the House or Senate’s au-
thority “to sometimes stand in for the executive and defend federal statutes”); Mank, su-
pra note 3, at 7 (noting that in his dissent in Windsor, Justice Scalia did not dispute Con-
gress’s right to represent itself in separation-of-powers disputes involving its authority). 
182 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress has stand-
ing to defend the constitutionality of statutes in the courts when the executive branch 
fails to do so); infra Part V.E; Mank, supra note 3, at 7 (contending that members of either 
house of Congress have standing to defend any statute that the executive branch fails to 
defend).  But see Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 574, 625–32 (arguing that the Take 
Care Clause gives the executive branch exclusive authority to defend federal laws and 
therefore bars congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to en-
force a law, and also contending that bicameral principles in the Constitution bar one 
house of Congress from defending a challenged federal statute).  Justice Thomas joined 
only Parts II and III of Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, on the merits, but not Part I on 
standing.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681 (listing opinions). 
183 Compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984 72 (5th rev. 
ed. 1984) (arguing that the president has a duty to enforce statutes he believes unconsti-
tutional), and Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382–84 
(1986) (same, but acknowledging that “the Executive can refuse to defend the constitu-
tionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly instituted”), with Neal Devins 
& Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509–10, 
512–13 (2012) (arguing that the President should not defend or enforce a statute he be-
lieves is unconstitutional).  See generally Mank, supra note 3, at 4-5, 17-22 (discussing con-
trasting views on whether a President must defend all federal statutes). 
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problems.184  Because it is unclear who has the authority to defend a 
federal statute if the executive refuses to do so, an attorney general 
might adopt a “middle position” of partially defending or enforcing a 
statute while raising or acknowledging doubts about the law’s consti-
tutionality, as the Obama Administration tried to do in the DOMA 
case in Windsor.185  In 2011, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder in-
formed U.S. House Speaker John Boehner that the DOJ would not 
defend the constitutionality of DOMA’s limitation of marriage to het-
erosexual couples, but implied that the DOJ would still enforce the 
law as a means to ensure that federal courts would have jurisdiction 
to decide the issue of the law’s constitutionality.186  Because it was like-
ly that the leadership of the House of Representatives would disagree 
with his view that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, Attorney 
General Holder’s letter concluded that “[o]ur attorneys will also noti-
fy the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full and fair op-
portunity to participate in the litigation in those cases,” but also stat-
ed that the executive, through the DOJ, would “remain a part[y] to 
 
184 The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25 
(1981); see also Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1198 (“Thus, one can say in general that refusals 
by the executive branch to defend or enforce acts of Congress are extraordinarily rare.  
But they do occur . . . .”). 
185 See Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care that the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 291, 306–07 (2012) (“Nondefense decisions better respect separation-of-
powers principles than do nonenforcement decisions. . . . Nondefense thus splits the dif-
ference: the President defers to Congress by giving the statute effect through enforce-
ment and by giving Congress an opportunity to defend the law, but he also gives voice, 
particularly in court, to his own concerns about the act’s constitutionality.”); Walter 
Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 1, 2011), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma (defending 
the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not to defend DOMA because 
“[h]ere, the president has decided to comply with the law and leave the final decision of 
its constitutionality to the courts, a course of action that respects the institutional roles of 
both Congress, which passed the law, and the judicial branch”); Mank, supra note 3, at 4–
5, 31–34, 36–38 (explaining the so-called “middle position,” which provides that the ex-
ecutive branch might, in certain situations, choose to enforce a law whose constitutionali-
ty it doubted in order to  create a justiciable controversy for the court’s review). 
186 See generally Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John 
A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-
defense-marriage-act [hereinafter Holder Letter] (suggesting that the executive branch 
deemed Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional and why it would no longer defend its con-
stitutionality in the courts, even though it would still continue to enforce the law); Mank, 
supra note 3, at 31–34, 36–38 (explaining that the executive branch continued to enforce 
Section 3 in order to preserve the injuries to pertinent parties, and in turn, preserve their 
standing in the courts). 
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the case and continue to represent the interests of the United  States 
throughout the litigation.”187 
In Windsor, Edith Windsor did not qualify for the marital exemp-
tion from the federal estate tax, which excludes from taxation “any 
interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to 
his surviving spouse,” because DOMA denied federal recognition of 
and benefits to same-sex spouses.188  She paid $363,053 in estate taxes 
to the U.S. government, but filed a refund request with the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) to seek full reimbursement of those taxes.189  
The IRS denied her refund request because Windsor was not a “sur-
viving spouse” under DOMA’s heterosexual definition of marriage 
because she was married to a woman, Thea Spyer.190  She next filed a 
refund suit in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.191  Windsor argued that DOMA’s denial of federal 
tax benefits to same sex married couples violated her constitutional 
right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.192 
In Windsor, Attorney General Holder notified the district court 
and House Speaker Boehner that the DOJ would not defend the con-
stitutionality of DOMA Section 3, but would continue to enforce the 
statute’s denial of federal benefits to same sex married couples while 
the federal courts decided its constitutionality.193  The Bipartisan Le-
gal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the House of Representatives, which 
includes the five majority and minority leaders of the House, voted 
along party lines, three Republicans to two Democrats, to intervene 
in the Windsor litigation to defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of 
DOMA.194  The Department of Justice did not oppose limited inter-
 
187 Holder Letter, supra note 186 (demonstrating that the Obama Administration knew that 
Congress would join the litigation to defend the constitutionality of Section 3); Mank, su-
pra note 3, at  32–33 (noting that Attorney General Holder’s letter served as notice for 
Congress to intervene in the pending lawsuits, including Windsor, if it felt so inclined). 
188 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) 
(2012)—the federal statute that controls the passing of property to spouses—which did 
not apply to the plaintiff in Windsor); Mank, supra note 3, at 36 (adding that the statute 
did not apply to the plaintiff in Windsor, because DOMA inhibits federal benefits and 
recognition to same-sex couples). 
189 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
190 Id.  
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 See id. at 2683–84 (noting the Obama Administration’s policy, encapsulated in Attorney 
General Holder’s letter to the House of Representatives, of not defending, but nonethe-
less enforcing, Section 3); Mank, supra note 3, at  36 (referencing the same). 
194 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (noting that BLAG decided to intervene in the lawsuit); Mank, 
supra note 3, at 36 (noting the same).  See Brief on the Merits of the Bipartisan Legal Ad-
visory Group of the House of Representatives, U.S. v. Windsor, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 
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vention by BLAG; however, the DOJ continued to represent the U.S. 
Government in the case.195  The district court denied BLAG’s motion 
to enter the suit as of right because the United States already was rep-
resented by the Department of Justice, but did grant BLAG’s inter-
vention as an interested party.196 
On the merits, the district court ruled against the United States 
because it held that Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional and or-
dered the Treasury to refund the estate tax paid by Windsor with in-
terest.197  Both the DOJ and BLAG filed notices of appeal even though 
the DOJ agreed with the district court’s decision holding Section 3 to 
be unconstitutional.198  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that Section 3 was uncon-
stitutional.199  However, the United States refused to comply with the 
lower court’s judgment, did not pay a refund to Windsor, and con-
tinued to enforce Section 3 of DOMA even though the executive 
branch agreed that the statute was unconstitutional in denying feder-
al benefits to same-sex married couples.200  The Obama Administra-
tion likely continued to enforce Section 3 of DOMA despite its view 
that the provision is unconstitutional to maintain sufficient adverse-
 
12–307, at ii n.* (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.supremecourtpreview.org (ex-
plaining the status of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in the “Parties to the Proceed-
ing” section of the brief); see also Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1212 (asserting that party poli-
tics influenced BLAG voting to interfere in the case); Mank, supra note 3, at  36–37 n.169 
(clarifying that during the Windsor litigation, the three Republican leaders in the Biparti-
san Legal Advisory Group—John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House; Eric Cantor, Majori-
ty Leader; and Kevin McCarthy, Majority Whip—supported the House’s intervention to 
defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, but the two Democratic leaders—
Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, and Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Whip—refused to sup-
port the majority position). 
195 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (explaining that the district court barred BLAG from interven-
ing as of right, but still granting it  intervention as an interested party); Mank, supra note 
3, at 37 (noting the same). 
196 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)) (explaining that the district 
court allowed BLAG to enter the case as an interested party, rather than allowing it inter-
vene as of right in light of what it reasoned was the DOJ’s already active role in represent-
ing the United States); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (stating the same). 
197 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (summarizing the district court’s ruling in favor of Windsor: 
Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional and the Department of Treasury was ordered to 
refund the plaintiff); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (explaining the same). 
198 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (stating that on appeal, the Second Circuit confirmed the dis-
trict court’s judgment); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (stating the same). 
199 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (stating that on appeal, the Second Circuit confirmed the dis-
trict court’s judgment); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (stating the same). 
200 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (noting that the executive branch had failed to comply with 
the district court’s ruling); Mank, supra note 3, at 31, 33, 38 (asserting that the executive 
branch failed to comply with the district court’s ruling despite agreeing with the holdings 
in order to maintain adverseness on appeal). 
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ness between the parties so that there would be Article III standing to 
give the Supreme Court the opportunity to decide the constitutional 
question in Windsor; there probably would have been no standing for 
appellate review if the U.S. had paid the tax refund to Windsor.201 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari so it could review the con-
stitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA.202  The Court also raised two ad-
ditional questions: (1) whether the United States’ agreement with 
Windsor’s legal position that Section 3 was unconstitutional preclud-
ed further appellate review and (2) whether BLAG had standing to 
appeal the decision.203  Because all of the parties agreed that the 
Court had jurisdiction to decide Windsor, the Court appointed Profes-
sor Vicki Jackson as amicus curiae to argue the contrary view that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the case.204 
C.  Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion: The House Leadership’s Intervention 
Favors Appellate Standing 
In determining whether any party had standing to appeal the 
Windsor case to the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy’s majority opin-
ion asked the question of “whether either the Government or BLAG, 
or both of them, were entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeals and 
later to seek certiorari and appear as parties here.”205  He reasoned 
that it was uncontested that Windsor had standing to sue in district 
court to seek to recover the estate taxes that Thea Spyer’s estate had 
paid to the U.S. government since being forced to disburse an alleg-
edly unconstitutional tax “‘causes a real and immediate economic in-
jury to the individual taxpayer.’”206  The Court observed that the ex-
ecutive’s agreement with Windsor that DOMA Section 3 is 
unconstitutional did not “deprive[] the [d]istrict [c]ourt of jurisdic-
tion to entertain and resolve the refund suit; for her injury (failure to 
obtain a refund allegedly required by law) was concrete, persisting, 
and unredressed.”207 
 
201 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (“It would be a different case if the Executive had taken the 
further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she was entitled under the District 
Court’s ruling.”); Mank, supra note 3, at 38. 
202 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38. 
203 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38 
204 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38. 
205 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38. 
206 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (quoting Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 
S. Ct. 2553, 2563  (2007)); Mank, supra note 3, at 38–39. 
207 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39. 
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However, the Windsor decision acknowledged that there was disa-
greement about “the standing of the parties, or aspiring parties, to 
take an appeal in the Court of Appeals and to appear as parties in 
further proceedings in this Court.”208  Professor Jackson, acting as the 
Court’s designated amicus against jurisdiction, provided a reasonable 
argument that no party had appellate standing once the executive 
branch and Ms. Windsor agreed with the district court’s decision and, 
accordingly, that both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court 
lacked jurisdiction over the case.209  Justice Kennedy summarized her 
position as follows: 
The amicus submits that once the President agreed with Windsor’s legal 
position and the District Court issued its judgment, the parties were no 
longer adverse.  From this standpoint the United States was a prevailing 
party below, just as Windsor was.  Accordingly, the amicus reasons, it is in-
appropriate for this Court to grant certiorari and proceed to rule on the 
merits; for the United States seeks no redress from the judgment entered 
against it.210 
Disagreeing with Professor Jackson’s arguments, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that her view that there was no appellate standing because 
the President and Ms. Windsor both agreed with the district court’s 
decision “elides the distinction between two principles: the jurisdic-
tional requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on its ex-
ercise.”211  The Windsor decision reasoned, “[i]n this case the United 
States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on 
appeal and in proceedings before this Court” because the United 
States’ refusal to pay the tax refund ordered by the district court cre-
ated an injury “sufficient” for Article III standing, even if the execu-
tive agreed with Windsor that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional.212  
The Court conceded, “It would be a different case if the Executive 
had taken the further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she 
was entitled under the District Court’s ruling.”213  Accordingly, by 
continuing to enforce DOMA Section 3, the DOJ established the 
economic injury essential for Article III standing before the Court 
even while arguing that the provision was unconstitutional.214 
 
208 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39. 
209 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39. 
210 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39. 
211 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39. 
212 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 40. 
213 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 40. 
214 Mank, supra note 3, at 40. 
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Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion conceded215 that the strongest 
case supporting Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is the Court’s 
1983 decision in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha.216  The 
Windsor decision appropriately cited Chadha for the proposition that 
“even where ‘the Government largely agree[s] with the opposing par-
ty on the merits of the controversy,’ there is sufficient adverseness 
and an ‘adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Govern-
ment intended to enforce the challenged law against that party.’”217  
Windsor reasoned that the Obama Administration’s refusal to refund 
Windsor’s taxes created sufficient adverseness in light of Chadha’s 
similar approach.218 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion questioned whether Chadha ac-
tually held that the government had standing before the Supreme 
Court or only concluded that the government agency had standing 
before the court of appeals.219  He concluded that the government 
did not have standing before the Supreme Court because it agreed 
with Ninth Circuit’s decision holding the statute unconstitutional; 
however, Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress had standing be-
fore the Supreme Court in Chadha because its views were adverse to 
the court of appeals’ decision.220  Conversely, the Windsor decision 
reasoned that the Supreme Court in Chadha had properly concluded 
that the executive branch had standing before both the court of ap-
peals and Supreme Court because the U.S. Government would have 
obeyed either court’s decision to deport Chadha, even though the 
executive argued that a deportation order was unconstitutional.221  
Similarly, the Windsor decision determined that the executive branch 
was sufficiently adverse to Ms. Windsor to have standing because it re-
fused to pay her the tax refund ordered by the district court.222 
Despite conceding that a prevailing party “generally” is not ag-
grieved and may not appeal, the Windsor decision reasoned that the 
requirement of adverse parties was a flexible prudential principle and 
 
215 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“The closest we have 
ever come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v. Chadha.”). 
216 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Mank, supra note 3, 
at 40; supra Part IV. 
217 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (2013) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940 n.12); Mank, supra 
note 3, at 42. 
218 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686-87; Mank, supra note 3, at 42. 
219 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 42. 
220 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 42. 
221 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (majority opinion); Mank, supra note 3, at 42. 
222 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 42. 
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not a mandatory Article III rule in all cases.223  The Court acknowl-
edged that the government’s method of enforcing a law that it ar-
gued was unconstitutional raised prudential concerns about the need 
for a genuine adversary to vigorously argue that the statute is consti-
tutional.224  The Windsor decision, nevertheless, determined the par-
ticipation of congressional leaders or a house of Congress as amici 
curiae meet the requirement for a valid adversary to argue in favor of 
a statute’s constitutionality despite the executive branch’s failure to 
defend the law.225  Similarly, in Chadha, the Supreme Court had con-
cluded that any prudential concern for an adversary arguing in favor 
of the statute’s constitutionality was satisfied when the court of ap-
peals had “‘invit[ed] and accept[ed] briefs from both Houses of 
Congress.’”226  The Windsor decision concluded that “BLAG’s sharp 
adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies the prudential concerns 
that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a deci-
sion with which the principal parties agree.”227  By acknowledging the 
role of the BLAG brief in meeting standing principles relating to ad-
versarial parties and stating that congressional briefs played an analo-
gous role in Chadha, the Windsor decision left open the possibility 
that in future cases federal courts might grant standing to Congress 
or a house of Congress that defend a statute that the executive refus-
es to defend, although the Court avoided the contentious issue of 
whether Congress or a house of Congress would have had standing to 
appeal if the executive branch had refused to enforce DOMA entire-
ly.228 
The Windsor decision did not formally decide whether Congress or 
a house of Congress would have had standing to sue on its own be-
cause the Court determined that the government had both pruden-
tial and Article III standing for appellate review in light of its adverse 
position of refusing to pay a refund to Windsor.229  The Court stated, 
“[f]or these reasons, the prudential and Article III requirements are 
met here; and, as a consequence, the Court need not decide whether 
BLAG would have standing to challenge the District Court’s ruling 
and its affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authori-
 
223 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 
(1980)) (citing Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011)); Mank, supra note 3, at 42. 
224 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687; Mank, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
225 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687; Mank, supra note 3, at 43. 
226 Windsor, 133 S. Ct.  at 2687 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940); Mank, supra note 3, at 43. 
227 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688; Mank, supra note 3, at 43. 
228 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687–88; Mank, supra note 3, at 43. 
229 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688; Mank, supra note 3, at 44. 
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ty.”230  The Windsor decision conceded that the executive’s refusal to 
defend DOMA raised serious concerns about whether there would be 
adverse parties required for appellate review and that the govern-
ment’s refusal to defend federal statutes would cause significant is-
sues if non-defense of statutes became a routine practice.231  However, 
the Windsor decision reasoned: 
But this case is not routine.  And the capable defense of the law by BLAG 
ensures that these prudential issues do not cloud the merits question, 
which is one of immediate importance to the Federal Government and to 
hundreds of thousands of persons.  These circumstances support the 
Court’s decision to proceed to the merits.232 
D.  Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion in Windsor: Congress Only Has 
Standing to Defend Its Core Constitutional Powers 
In his dissenting opinion in Windsor, Justice Scalia argued that 
Congress only has Article III standing to sue in federal courts when it 
is defending its core constitutional powers, as in the Chadha deci-
sion.233  Furthermore, he contended Congress does not have standing 
to defend federal statutes, even when the executive refuses to defend 
a statute, as in Windsor.234  Accordingly, Justice Scalia would allow 
Congress or a house of Congress to have standing in only limited cir-
cumstances because he believed that Article II usually gives the Presi-
dent exclusive authority under the Take Care Clause to defend or en-
force federal laws, unless a law infringes upon essential congressional 
authority.235 
Although conceding that Ms. Windsor had standing to sue in fed-
eral district court for a tax refund, Justice Scalia in his dissenting 
opinion argued that no party in the Windsor case had standing to ap-
peal the district court’s judgment because both Ms. Windsor and the 
U.S. government agreed with the court’s determination that DOMA 
Section 3 is unconstitutional.236  Because Article III standing man-
dates that a party demonstrate that it has an injury requiring redress, 
he argued that friendly, non-adversarial parties may not collude to 
 
230 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688; Mank, supra note 3, at 44. 
231 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688–89; Mank, supra note 3, at 44. 
232 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689; Mank, supra note 3, at 44–45. 
233 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01, 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–
46. 
234 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700, 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–51. 
235 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01, 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–
47. 
236 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699–2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45. 
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obtain an advisory opinion from a federal court.237  He argued that 
the Court had never before recognized a suit where a petitioner ef-
fectively sought an affirmance of the judgment against it.238  Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion conceded that “[t]he closest we have ever 
come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v. 
Chadha,” but he argued that the two cases were distinguishable be-
cause in Chadha the House and Senate intervened in the case to de-
fend their core constitutional powers.239 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion argued that the executive usual-
ly has exclusive authority under Article II’s Take Care Clause to de-
fend, or not to defend, federal statutes, even in cases when a Presi-
dent refuses to enforce or defend a federal statute.240  However, he 
admitted an exception, as in the Chadha decision, where Congress is 
protecting its institutional authority.241  Justice Scalia explained that 
the Chadha litigation involved the institutional powers of Congress 
and, accordingly, Congress had standing to sue in that case, but not 
in a case like Windsor where it sought to defend a statute unrelated to 
its core institutional powers, such as DOMA.242 
Conversely, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion argued that Justice 
Scalia’s and the United States’ argument that the precedent for con-
gressional standing in Chadha should be construed to apply only to 
rare cases when Congress is defending its institutional or procedural 
authority raises difficult line drawing issues since Congress also has a 
strong institutional interest in defending federal statutes because 
lawmaking is a core legislative function.243  Because reading Chadha to 
permit Congress or a house of Congress standing to defend federal 
statutes that involve Congress’s institutional authority could be ex-
panded to encompass standing in other situations, such as the Wind-
 
237 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45; see also Hall, 
supra note 30, at 1550–51 (“[A]s a textual matter, the Cases or Controversies Clause 
seems plainly to require interested parties on both sides of the case.  A one-sided ‘case’ or 
‘controversy’ is an oxymoron.”). 
238 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699–700 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45. 
239 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45. 
240 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
241 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2700 n.2 (“[In Chadha] the Justice 
Department’s refusal to defend the legislation was in accord with its longstanding (and 
entirely reasonable) practice of declining to defend legislation that in its view infringes 
upon Presidential powers.”); Mank, supra note 3, at 46; see also Hall, supra note 30, at 1549 
(“Chadha, in short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional stake to support a 
case or controversy where it seeks to defend a power granted to it by a statute.  Chadha 
does not hold that Congress may intervene to defend any challenged federal stat-
ute . . . .”). 
242 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700, 2700 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 46. 
243 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713–14 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
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sor case where the executive declined to defend the constitutionality 
of a statute, some scholars contend that a president’s prerogative to 
defend federal statutes pursuant to Article II’s Take Care Clause is 
completely exclusive and that the Chadha decision was incorrectly de-
cided to the extent it allowed congressional standing to defend any 
statute, even ones related to core congressional powers.244  Justice 
Scalia, however, took a middle position between Justice Alito and ac-
ademics favoring exclusive executive defense of federal statutes by 
distinguishing Chadha as the rare case where Congress has standing 
to defend its institutional prerogatives, but arguing that congressional 
standing was inappropriate in Windsor where President Obama’s re-
fusal to defend DOMA Section 3 had no impact on core congression-
al authority.245 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that neither Ms. Windsor 
nor the U.S. government had standing to appeal from the district 
court’s decision in Windsor because both she and the executive 
agreed with the trial court’s judgment.246  Conversely, the majority in 
the Windsor decision reasoned that the Supreme Court in Chadha had 
stated that the INS had standing before both the court of appeals and 
the Supreme Court despite the government’s position agreeing with 
Mr. Chadha that the deportation statute at issue was unconstitutional 
because the executive branch would have obeyed either court’s deci-
sion to deport Chadha, and, accordingly, the U.S. government was 
sufficiently adverse to Chadha to meet Article III standing require-
ments before the Supreme Court.247  Analogously, the Windsor deci-
sion concluded that the U.S. government was sufficiently adverse to 
Ms. Windsor’s interests to have Article III standing to appeal to both 
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court because the executive 
 
244 Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 573–75, 623–30 (arguing Take Care Clause gives a Pres-
ident exclusive authority to defend federal laws, excludes congressional standing to inter-
vene even when if a president refuses to enforce law and that Chadha decision was incor-
rect to recognize congressional standing to defend federal statutes even in limited cases); 
Mank, supra note 3, at 46.  But see Gorod, supra note 31, at 1219–20 (“Defending [a] 
law . . . . does not focus on the operation of the law and generally will not affect its opera-
tion at all. . . . [T]he Executive simply provides the court with its understanding of what 
the Constitution requires . . . .”); Greene, supra note 33, at 592 (contending that, if Con-
gress sues for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a law, Congress is not 
“controlling the execution of law”). 
245 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700, 2700 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 46–47; 
see also Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 623 (“[N]o Justice in Windsor challenged the 
power of the House or the Senate to sometimes stand in for the executive and defend 
federal statutes.”). 
246 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 47–48. 
247 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 48. 
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refused to pay her the estate tax refund mandated by the district 
court’s decision.248  The disagreement between Justice Scalia and the 
majority over whether the executive was sufficiently adverse to Ms. 
Windsor’s interests to have Article III standing to appeal to the court 
of appeals and the Supreme Court is relevant to the question con-
gressional standing because the argument for legislative standing is 
arguably greater when a president refuses to defend a federal statute 
or the executive lacks standing to defend a statute, as Justice Alito ar-
gued in his dissenting opinion in Windsor.249 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion clearly rebuked the majority 
opinion’s approach that “the requirement of adverseness” between 
the parties in a case is only a “prudential” principle of standing that is 
waivable by the federal courts in appropriate cases.250  He argued that 
the Court had previously treated adverseness between the parties as 
an essential Article III standing mandate.251  He reasoned that the 
availability of amicus curiae willing to skillfully argue the other side of 
a question did not meet the Article III requirement that there must 
be adverse parties to establish a justiciable “case” or “controversy” in 
federal court.252 
Under Justice Scalia’s approach to executive and legislative stand-
ing, Congress or a house of Congress would not have standing to sue 
whenever a President refuses to defend a statute, but only if Congress 
sues to protect its core institutional powers, as in Chadha.253  Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, Congress must normally use its legislative author-
ities, including limiting appropriations or refusing to confirm presi-
dential appointees instead of suing the executive in federal court, to 
protest a President’s refusal to defend or enforce a law unrelated to 
core congressional institutional authority.254  In many cases, however, 
it may be impractical for Congress or a house of Congress to act 
against such executive recalcitrance, especially if the Senate and the 
House cannot agree on concerted action.255 
 
248 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 48. 
249 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting); infra Part V.E; Mank, supra note 3, at 
7, 52–56. 
250 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 49. 
251 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 49. 
252 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 49. 
253 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
254 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 51. 
255 Greene, supra note 33, at 591 (discussing practical problems facing Congress in protest-
ing a president’s refusal to enforce or defend a statute); Mank, supra note 3, at 51–52, 51 
n.261 (noting the same). 
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E.  Justice Alito’s Argument for Congressional Standing by a House Of 
Congress Where a President Refuses to Defend a Federal Statute 
Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the executive was not 
an appropriate adverse party before the Supreme Court in Windsor 
because the United States concurred with Ms. Windsor that the Dis-
trict Court’s judgment striking down DOMA Section 3 was valid.256  
Then, Justice Alito addressed the “much more difficult question” of 
whether the leadership of the House of Representatives, BLAG, had 
standing to appeal that decision.257  Disagreeing with both the majori-
ty and Justice Scalia, Justice Alito determined that BLAG had “Article 
III standing in its own right, quite apart from its status as an interve-
nor.”258 
Justice Alito argued that BLAG had Article III standing to appeal 
the district court’s decision in Windsor because it was the authorized 
representative of the House of Representatives, which was entitled to 
standing in that case since it suffered an injury in fact when the exec-
utive refused to enforce DOMA Section 3 and that injury was redress-
able by a decision in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.259  He 
supported his view that BLAG had standing by citing Chadha’s hold-
ing that both houses of Congress were “‘proper parties’” to defend 
the constitutionality of the one-house veto statute in that case.260  Jus-
tice Alito inferred that the Chadha decision’s recognition of congres-
sional standing was based on an unspoken reasoning that Congress 
suffers an injury sufficient for standing purposes in every case where a 
federal statute passed by Congress is struck down by a lower court as 
unconstitutional and the executive refuses to appeal that decision.261  
The United States sought to distinguish Chadha from the situation in 
Windsor by treating the former decision as “‘involv[ing] an unusual 
statute that vested the House and the Senate themselves each with 
special procedural rights—namely, the right effectively to veto Execu-
tive action.’”262  Justice Scalia offered similar arguments for distin-
guishing the two cases when he claimed that congressional standing 
 
256 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52. 
257 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52. 
258 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52. 
259 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14, 2712 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52. 
260 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–13 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting and discussing Chadha); 
Mank, supra note 3, at 52. 
261 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–13 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52. 
262 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the United States on 
the Jurisdictional Questions at 36, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 
12-307)); Mank, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
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in Chadha applied only to cases in which the executive refuses to de-
fend a statute that implicates a core institutional legislative authori-
ty.263 
Disagreeing with both the U.S. government and Justice Scalia on 
congressional standing, Justice Alito provided a novel approach that 
Congress has standing in every case in which the U.S. government 
declines to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute because 
enacting such statutes is Congress’s “central function.”264  Rejecting 
both the U.S. government’s and Justice Scalia’s interpretation of 
Chadha as a case involving the power of the legislative branch, Justice 
Alito argued: 
But that is a distinction without a difference: just as the Court of Appeals 
decision that the Chadha Court affirmed impaired Congress’ power by 
striking down the one-house veto, so the Second Circuit’s decision here 
impairs Congress’ legislative power by striking down an Act of Congress.  
The United States has not explained why the fact that the impairment at 
issue in Chadha was “special” or “procedural” has any relevance to wheth-
er Congress suffered an injury.  Indeed, because legislating is Congress’ 
central function, any impairment of that function is a more grievous in-
jury than the impairment of a procedural add-on.265 
Justice Alito relied upon the Coleman decision, which held that a 
group of state senators who arguably cast the decisive votes to defeat a 
proposed amendment to the federal constitution had standing to 
contest the amendment’s validity, to support his theory that Congress 
or a house of Congress has standing to defend any statute that the 
executive refuses to defend.266  He argued that the House of Repre-
sentatives was a “necessary party” for DOMA’s passage, and, therefore 
had standing in Windsor.267  He explained, 
By striking down § 3 of DOMA as unconstitutional, the Second Circuit ef-
fectively “held for naught” an Act of Congress.  Just as the state-senator-
petitioners in Coleman were necessary parties to the amendment’s ratifica-
tion, the House of Representatives was a necessary party to DOMA’s pas-
sage; indeed, the House’s vote would have been sufficient to prevent 
 
263
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (“Because Chadha 
concerned the validity of a mode of congressional action—the one-house legislative ve-
to—the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what they claimed to be 
one of their institutional powers.  The Executive choosing not to defend that power, we 
permitted the House and Senate to intervene.  Nothing like that is present here.”); Mank, 
supra note 3, at 53. 
264 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–13 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53. 
265 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53. 
266 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53. 
267 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53. 
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DOMA’s repeal if the Court had not chosen to execute that repeal judi-
cially.268 
Disagreeing with both the United States and the Court-appointed 
amicus, Professor Jackson, Justice Alito argued that the Raines deci-
sion had not rejected congressional standing in all circumstances.269  
He contended that “Raines dealt with individual Members of Con-
gress and specifically pointed to the individual Members’ lack of insti-
tutional endorsement as a sign of their standing problem” and there-
fore, only barred standing in suits brought by individual legislators.270  
Justice Alito distinguished Windsor as different from the individual 
suits in Raines because BLAG represented the House of Representa-
tives as an institution.271 
Additionally, he reasoned that BLAG and the House in the Wind-
sor litigation were more similar to the key legislators whose votes con-
trolled the outcome in Coleman than the individual legislators in 
Raines, who had not played an important role in enacting the chal-
lenged legislation.272  He reasoned that, 
[T]he Members in Raines—unlike the state senators in Coleman—were 
not the pivotal figures whose votes would have caused the Act to fail ab-
sent some challenged action.  Indeed, it is telling that Raines character-
ized Coleman as standing “for the proposition that legislators whose votes 
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act 
have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not 
go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nul-
lified.”  521 U.S., at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312.  Here, by contrast, passage by the 
House was needed for DOMA to become law.  U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7 (bi-
cameralism and presentment requirements for legislation).273 
Disagreeing with both the U.S. government and Justice Scalia on 
congressional standing, Justice Alito concluded that Congress or a 
house of Congress has the institutional authority to defend federal 
statutes when a President declines to do so: 
I appreciate the argument that the Constitution confers on the President 
alone the authority to defend federal law in litigation, but in my view, as I 
have explained, that argument is contrary to the Court’s holding in 
Chadha, and it is certainly contrary to the Chadha Court’s endorsement of 
the principle that “Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a 
statute” when the Executive refuses to do so onconstitutional grounds.  
462 U.S., at 940, 103 S. Ct. 2764; see also 2 U.S.C. § 288h(7) (Senate Le-
gal Counsel shall defend the constitutionality of Acts of Congress when 
 
268 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53–54. 
269 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 54. 
270 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 54. 
271 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712 n.2, 2013; Mank, supra note 3, at 54. 
272 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714; Mank, supra note 3, at 54. 
273 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714; Mank, supra note 3, at 54. 
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placed in issue).  Accordingly, in the narrow category of cases in which a 
court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to de-
fend the Act, Congress both has standing to defend the undefended stat-
ute and is a proper party to do so. 274 
F.  Criticisms of Congressional Standing and Especially Justice Alito’s Broad 
Approach to Congressional Standing 
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Alito’s theory of congressional 
standing and responded that a President has almost exclusive sole au-
thority under the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution to 
defend or enforce every federal statute, except in cases like Chadha 
where Congress is suing to protect its core institutional authority.275  
Justice Scalia argued that Justice Alito’s approach to congressional 
standing did almost as much damage to the separation of powers as 
the majority’s overly lenient approach to standing by “similarly ele-
vat[ing] the Court to the ‘primary’ determiner of constitutional ques-
tions involving the separation of powers, and, to boot, increas[ing] 
the power of the most dangerous branch” by establishing a new sys-
tem “in which Congress can hale the Executive before the courts not 
only to vindicate its own institutional powers to act, but to correct a 
perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws.”276  Justice Scalia 
maintained that Justice Alito’s view of congressional standing would 
undermine the traditional standing model based on private lawsuits 
by only those actually injured by a law to instead establish a new par-
adigm “in which Congress and the Executive can pop immediately in-
to court, in their institutional capacity, whenever the President refus-
es to implement a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, and 
whenever he implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress’s 
liking.”277 
Justice Scalia’s interpretation that Justice Alito’s theory of con-
gressional standing would enable Congress to sue in federal court 
 
274 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); Mank, supra note 3, 
at 55. 
275 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing a president has broad dis-
cretion whether to enforce federal laws pursuant to the Take Care Clause in the Constitu-
tion and that Congress does not have standing without an injury to challenge executive 
non-enforcement); Mank, supra note 3, at 56; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 573–78 (1992) (concluding that Article II and Article III of the Constitution limit 
Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury); 
Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 572–73, 625–30 (arguing that the Take Care Clause 
gives the executive exclusive authority to defend federal laws thus excluding congression-
al standing to intervene even when a President refuses to enforce a law). 
276 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 56. 
277 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
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whenever a president “implements a law in a manner that is not to 
Congress’s liking” is a questionable and likely unfair analysis of Jus-
tice Alito’s dissenting opinion, because the Windsor decision involved 
the much narrower question of a President who refused to defend a 
federal statute, and Justice Alito never directly stated such a broad 
approach to standing.278  Justice Scalia made a more reasonable criti-
cism when he opined that Justice Alito’s theory of congressional 
standing could allow plaintiffs to make believable arguments that 
federal courts may consider political disputes historically rejected as 
unsuitable for adjudication.279  Justice Scalia asserted that the “reason-
ing” of Raines foreclosed suits by Congress about how a President ex-
ecutes federal statutes even though Justice Alito was correct that that 
decision “did not formally decide this issue” because the decision 
treated several types of disputes between a president and Congress 
regarding such matters as the appointment power, removal power, 
legislative veto and pocket veto as non-justiciable by federal courts.280  
Rejecting Justice Alito’s broad view of congressional standing, Justice 
Scalia contended that a President and Congress should use tradition-
al political methods such as the denial of appropriations or executive 
appointments when Congress seeks to punish a President who refuses 
to defend a statute that Congress believes is constitutional.281  Howev-
er, some theoretical political remedies such as Congress’s impeach-
ment authority,282 which requires a two-thirds vote by the Senate, are 
impractical, and, therefore, a lawsuit may be the only effective way for 
Congress to challenge some executive decisions.283 
Some academics have reasoned that the bicameral structure of 
Congress mandates that both houses agree to act to challenge presi-
dential decisions, and, therefore, does not allow one house to take 
 
278 Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with id. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., 
dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 57. 
279 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 57. 
280 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 57. 
281 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting) at 2704–05; Mank, supra note 3, at 57. 
282 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
283 See Greene, supra note 33, at 591 (contending that the impeachment process is impracti-
cal in addressing many executive actions); Mank, supra note 3, at 51–52 (same); Nash, su-
pra note 3, at 362–63, 388 (arguing the availability of impeachment would doom legisla-
tors’ standing); Pickett, supra note 31, at 473–74 (asserting impeachment would be too 
broad a step for executive nonenforcement).  But see Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 
624 (“In separating legislation from implementation, moreover, the Constitution makes 
clear that Congress may not control those implementing federal law—outside the ap-
pointment, statutory, and removal mechanisms specified in the Constitution.”). 
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independent judicial action; their position implicitly contradicts Jus-
tice Alito’s view that BLAG had standing in the Windsor decision on 
behalf of the House of Representatives to appeal the district court’s 
decision that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional.284  Conversely, 
there is a plausible argument that the Constitution’s proscription for 
bicameral legislative decisions in Article I, Section 1—compelling all 
legislative authority to be consigned to a Congress including a Senate 
and a House of Representatives—and Section 7—necessitating all 
bills be passed by both the House and Senate before being presented 
to the President—do not squarely bar congressional standing by one 
house of Congress.285  Furthermore, some constitutional provisions do 
not require bicameralism such as the Senate’s appointment of federal 
officers and judges.286  Additionally, Justice Alito in his Windsor dis-
senting opinion suggested that neither Coleman nor Raines imposed 
bicameral action requirements on all congressional litigation.287 
Professor Grove has claimed that  Congress lacks Article III stand-
ing to defend federal statutes in federal court because Article I of the 
Constitution does not affirmatively grant Congress the authority to 
enforce or defend federal statutes in Article III courts.288  Conversely, 
she implicitly concedes that her argument is inconsistent with 
Chadha, and, as a result, she contends that decision was incorrectly 
decided to the degree it authorized the House and the Senate to in-
tervene in the case to defend the constitutionality of the challenged 
statute.289  Although Justice Scalia believes that Congress does not 
 
284 Compare Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 573–75, 603–22 (arguing that bicameral prin-
ciples in the Constitution bar one house of Congress from defending challenged federal 
statutes), with Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing BLAG had 
standing in the Windsor decision on behalf of the House of Representatives to appeal the 
district court’s decision that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional); see Mank, supra note 3, 
at 54–55. 
285 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (prescribing bicameralism and presentment requirements for legis-
lation); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–46 (1983) (dis-
cussing bicameral provisions in Article I of the Constitution); Mank, supra note 3, at 55. 
286 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Nash, supra note 3, at 366. 
287 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713–14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing Coleman and Raines); 
Mank, supra note 3, at 55. 
288 Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1315–16, 1353–65 
(2014); Mank, supra note 3, at 56. 
289 Grove, supra note 288, at 1360–61; (“The Supreme Court overlooked these structural 
concerns [arguing against congressional enforcement or defense of federal laws] entirely 
in Chadha, when it permitted the House and Senate counsel to intervene in defense of 
the statute authorizing the legislative veto. . . . But the Court did not authorize interven-
tion by any component of Congress until Chadha.  Given the lack of historical support for 
the Court’s assertion, and the fact that the Court did not even hold that the House or the 
Senate had standing to appeal, this one-sentence declaration in Chadha provides scant 
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have standing to challenge the almost exclusive executive authority 
under Article II to defend or enforce most statutes without legislative 
intervention, he acknowledges that the Chadha decision was correct 
in allowing Congress to defend its core institutional powers.290 
CONCLUSION 
While there are many unanswered questions about when Congress 
or a house of Congress has standing to sue a President, Judge Colly-
er’s decision in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell was on solid 
ground in allowing a house of Congress to challenge President 
Obama’s alleged misuse of the appropriations process, because that 
process is a core institutional power of Congress and of the House of 
Representatives in particular, where appropriation bills are supposed 
to originate.291  The Raines decision appropriately limited suits and 
standing by individual legislators because of the potential for endless 
lawsuits that could clog the federal courts.292  By contrast, the Coleman 
decision allowed a suit that addressed whether the Kansas executive 
had nullified a law so as to defeat the will of the legislature.293  Fur-
thermore, Judge Collyer appropriately relied upon the Supreme 
Court’s Arizona State Legislature decision and a series of cases in the 
D.C. Circuit for the principle that a state legislature, Congress, or a 
house of Congress may defend its institutional authority against ex-
ecutive interference or other potentially unconstitutional institu-
tions.294 
There are difficult line drawing questions between when Congress 
is challenging how a President implements or enforces a law, and 
when executive action intrudes on core institutional legislative au-
thority.295  But the Chadha decision clearly implied that Congress has 
standing to sue when the executive branch allegedly intrudes on core 
 
support for congressional standing to represent the federal government in court.”); 
Mank, supra note 3, at 56. 
290 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2700–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the executive in 
most circumstances has exclusive authority to defend federal statutes under Article II thus 
excluding congressional standing to intervene even when a President refuses to enforce a 
law, but acknowledging an exception in Chadha where Congress is defending its core in-
stitutional authority under the Constitution); Mank, supra note 3, at 53–56. 
291 See supra Part III; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate 
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amend-
ments as on other Bills.”). 
292 See supra Part II.A.2. 
293 See supra Part II.A.1. 
294 See supra Parts II.A.4, II.B and III. 
295 See supra Parts II.A.4 and Part III. 
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legislative authority.296  Granting standing to Congress or a house of 
Congress does not guarantee that the legislature will prevail on the 
merits of its suit.  In the end, federal courts may conclude that Presi-
dent Obama’s appropriations under Section 1402 do not violate the 
Appropriations Clause.297  This Article advocates standing in this suit, 
but does not offer an opinion on the ultimate merits of the case. 
Judge Collyer did not discuss either Chadha or Windsor.298  Chadha 
at least indirectly addressed and supported the issue of congressional 
institutional suits, which were not at issue in the Coleman or the Arizo-
na State Legislature decisions because they involved state legislators.299  
The Windsor majority decision did not directly address congressional 
standing.300  However, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Windsor 
acknowledged that Congress has standing to challenge a statute that 
threatens its core institutional authority as in the Chadha decision.301  
Even if the Court is not willing to endorse Justice Alito’s broad ap-
proach to congressional standing in his dissenting opinion in Wind-
sor,302 Judge Collyer’s opinion arguably goes no further than Justice 
Scalia or Chadha in supporting congressional standing to challenge 
executive actions or statutes that threaten Congress’s core institu-
tional authority.303  Additionally, the Windsor majority decision argua-
bly implicitly supported action by a house of Congress in taking into 
account the BLAG amicus brief as a significant factor in recognizing 
standing in that case, although the Court deliberately avoided the 
contentious question of congressional standing.304  Accordingly, U.S. 
House of Representatives v. Burwell appropriately found congressional 
standing to challenge President Obama’s alleged misuse of the ap-
propriations process because a core institutional power of Congress 
was at stake.305 
 
296 See supra Part IV. 
297 See supra Part III. 
298 See supra Part III. 
299 See supra Part II.A.1. 
300 See supra Part V.C. 
301 See supra Part V.D. 
302 See supra Part V.E. 
303 See supra Parts III, IV and V.D. 
304 See supra Part V.C. 
305 See supra Parts III.  See generally Adler, supra note 152 (arguing law surrounding congres-
sional standing is unclear, but that Judge Collyer’s recognition of standing is plausible in 
light of the danger of executive overreach into core legislative authority); Pickett, supra 
note 31, at 468–75 (arguing Congress should have institutional standing when a president 
refuses to enforce a federal statute because a president has violated the Take Care Clause 
in the Constitution and political remedies are ineffective).  But see Bagley, supra note 150, 
at 1–2 (arguing Judge Collyer’s recognition of standing in U.S. House of Representatives v. 
Burwell was wrong because the case involved a question of statutory interpretation 
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through the implementation of a statute and that her approach would undermine stand-
ing limits by allowing Congress to “dress[] up a statutory claim in constitutional garb”); 
Cheslock, supra note 131, at 163–74 (arguing the political question doctrine and lack of 
standing bar Burwell suit); Dellinger, supra note 150, at 2–3 (arguing judicial recognition 
of standing in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell would lead to a vast and unwarranted 
expansion of standing when the executive and legislature disagree about the interpreta-
tion of a statute).  See generally Stern, supra note 25, at 3–4, 42-56 (arguing that separation 
of powers and political question doctrine concerns make it unlikely Supreme Court will 
recognize congressional standing, but acknowledging the law is not absolutely clear on is-
sue of congressional standing). 
